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Abstract

JUDICIAL LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS AND THE JUROR’S
ABILITY TO DISREGARD INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE:
CAN RAISING JUROR SUSPICION INFLUENCE THE DECISION-MAKING
PROCESS?
by
Courtney Hougham

Advisor: Professor Maureen O’Connor
During the course of a trial, a judge will instruct the jury on how they are to act and reach
decisions. The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of different judicial
instructions on a juror’s ability to evaluate testimony. The research looked at how
instructions can interact with a juror’s ability to disregard a piece of evidence ruled
inadmissible for different reasons. The design was a 3x5 complete factorial design. The
stimulus material was a murder trial summary with weak evidence against the defendant,
with the key piece of testimony being a hair found on the victim that matches the
defendant. This evidence was objected to and admitted or not admitted into evidence
depending on the condition. The hypotheses test how a juror’s decision-making process
is influenced by a combination of judicial instructions, including one designed to raise
suspicion, the ruling – admitted or not admitted, and the reason behind the ruling.
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Chapter 1.
―Because I have no doubt that serious-minded and
responsible men are able to shut their minds to unreliable
information when exercising their judgment, I reject the
assumption of the majority that giving instructions to a jury
to disregard…is an empty gesture.‖
(Justice White, U.S. v. Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, 1968)
―If you throw a skunk into a jury box, you can’t instruct the
jury not to smell it.‖
(Justice Gewin, Dunn v. U.S., 307 F.2d 883, 1962, Fifth Circuit)

During the course of a trial, a judge will instruct the jury on how they are to act
and reach decisions. One set of instructions is issued prior to the start of the trial and
another is issued prior to deliberations when the judge charges the jury on how they are to
render a verdict and apply the law to the admissible evidence presented during the course
of the trial. Within the trial, a judge may need to admonish the jury to disregard evidence
that has been deemed inadmissible, but either purposely or inadvertently is inserted into
the proceedings. This admonition to the jury to disregard the information is an attempt to
remove any prejudicial implications produced by the evidence, which could influence the
verdict.
Psychological research suggests that people have a difficult time ignoring
information once they have heard it. This is particularly problematic in the courtroom
where jurors are often instructed to disregard information they have heard. The ability or
inability of a jury to comply with judicial instructions affects the court proceedings and
the overall fairness of the legal system. Verdicts are sometimes reversed based on the
belief by appellate courts that a judicial admonition to ignore evidence is not enough and
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that jurors are not able to ignore inadmissible testimony when they have been instructed
to do so; however, verdicts are also upheld even after potentially damning inadmissible
evidence has been introduced. Varying the timing and the content of instructions may
reduce the psychological challenge of ignoring information once it has been introduced.
This study explored the effects of judicial pre-trial instructions specifically aimed
at inadmissible evidence, both in a general instruction and in an instruction designed to
raise juror suspicion levels, while including further judicial admonitions in the trial. For
the purpose of this research, the term ―suspicion‖ is used to refer to raising participants’
awareness and making them more critical of the evidence by questioning motives.
The effectiveness of pre-trial, in-trial, and suspicion-arousing instructions are
examined through the lens of the ―just verdict‖ hypothesis (Kassin & Sommers, 1997).
The just verdict hypothesis suggests that jurors are interested in rendering a verdict that is
accurate or ―just‖ - guilty for defendants perceived as guilty, not guilty for others. In
order to render a just verdict, jurors will use all the information available to them as long
as they find it to be relevant to the case at hand and reliable or accurate. As such, Kassin
and Sommers argue jurors can and will disregard inadmissible evidence that is unreliable
because it does not help in reaching a just verdict. However, jurors will not disregard
evidence that is inadmissible solely for due process - or legal - reasons if the juror
perceives that evidence as reliable. For example, evidence that is the result of an illegal
search -- if the murder weapon is found in the defendant’s house as a result of an illegal
search and jurors are told to disregard that information -- they would be hard pressed to
ignore it because they want to render a just or accurate verdict.
This study examined whether the ―just verdict‖ effect could be reduced by a
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simple pre-trial instruction warning jurors of the possibility of inadmissible evidence that
would need to be ignored. If that simple warning were not enough, this study also
examined whether the ―just verdict‖ effect could be reduced by a pre-trial instruction
designed not only to warn of the possibility of inadmissible evidence but also to raise
suspicion regarding the motives behind the introduction of certain evidence. In doing so,
this study varied both the timing and content of judicial instructions by drawing on the
strong points of previous research endeavors and exploring factors that are relatively
absent in the literature.
Additionally, the study explored the effect of an in-trial admonition on the
decision-making process. Would instructing participants to ―give the evidence the weight
they think it deserves‖ make them think more critically about the evidence?

Literature Review

Case Law: Inadmissible evidence and harmless error
United States Federal Rules of Evidence (F.R.E.) 401 and 403 define relevant
evidence for Federal trials and specify certain situations when relevant evidence is not
admissible. F.R.E. 401 states that relevant evidence is ―evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.‖ Relevant
evidence may be excluded when ―its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
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evidence.‖ (F.R.E. 403). Although these rules govern Federal trials, most states have
similar approaches to dealing with relevancy and admissibility.
Despite the rules, there are times when evidence is presented at trial that had been
or is subsequently deemed inadmissible by the judge. When this happens, a judge has it
within her rights to declare a mistrial; however, this is not the preferred solution. Instead,
the judge is likely to instruct the jury that they are to disregard the evidence and that the
evidence has been stricken from the record. Although this has been the longstanding
solution to overcoming the potentially prejudicial impact of inadmissible evidence, there
is little consensus among courts on when such an admonition is effective or the manner in
which the court is meant to apply the standards.
In U.S. v. Escalante (1980), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled,
―where evidence heard by the juror is later ruled inadmissible, a cautionary instruction is
ordinarily sufficient to cure any alleged prejudice to the defendant.‖ However, the same
circuit court recognized in U.S. v. Gann (1984) that ―declaring a mistrial is appropriate
only where cautionary instruction is unlikely to cure the prejudicial effect.‖ As a result,
some cases are upheld on appeal and some are overturned with no clear indication to a
layperson as to why certain evidence is considered prejudicial while other evidence is
not.
Bruton v. U.S. (1968) involved hearsay confession evidence against two codefendants. A witness testified that co-defendant Evans had told him that he, Evans, and
Bruton had committed the crime. The court instructed the jury to disregard the evidence
against Bruton but they could use it against Evans. The jury convicted both men. On
appeal, the appellate court upheld the conviction on the grounds that the instructions were
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sufficient. The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed reversing Bruton’s conviction. Justice
Black, in a concurring opinion, stated that the ―admonition to the jury to use a confession
as evidence only against the confessor…is ineffective in that the effect of such a
confession cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors.‖
In State v. Nowakowski (1982), the defendant moved for a mistrial after a
prosecution witness asked why the defendant had not given a statement if he was
innocent – a question that is inappropriate as it violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
rights. The trial judge denied the request for a mistrial and instructed the jury to
disregard the statement. On appeal, the defendant claimed the instruction failed to
eliminate the prejudicial effect of the statement. The defendant relied on State v. Tinsley
(1980) in which the Supreme Court of Connecticut found that it was unlikely that the
prejudicial effect of inadmissible evidence could be cured by the instruction; the Tinsley
case involved sexual assault. The Supreme Court of Connecticut did not accept
Nowakowski’s Tinsley claim and upheld Nowakowski’s conviction finding the
instruction was adequate.
In Greer v. Miller (1987), the prosecutor asked Greer why he had remained silent
after he was arrested. The defense objected, the judge sustained the objection, and
instructed the jury to disregard questions to which objections were sustained. The
prosecutor did not continue the line of questioning. On appeal, the court reversed the
verdict stating that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the
other evidence was not overwhelming and the instruction to disregard was ―insufficient to
cure the error.‖ The Supreme Court did not agree and decided both the sustained
objection and cautionary instruction protected the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
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The standard that appellate courts apply when dealing with erroneously
introduced evidence is whether the error is ―harmless.‖ The harmless error standard was
established by Congress in a 1919 statute in order to quell the number of trial reversals
(Cooper, 2002). This statute states: ―on the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in
any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard
to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties‖ (28 USCS
§2111) . It was in this statute where the phrase ―substantial rights‖ was introduced – a
decision could not be overturned unless it was deemed that a person’s substantial rights
were affected. This language was adopted in 1944 in Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which defines harmless error as ―any error, defect, irregularity, or
variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.‖
Since the introduction of this standard, application of the harmless error standard
has followed two central interpretations. Although these two interpretations vary, they
are not necessarily distinct. The first interpretation asks whether the error affected how
the specific jury in the case reached its verdict. The second interpretation asks whether
the remaining evidence - ignoring the error - was sufficient for a hypothetical jury to
reach a guilty verdict.
The Supreme Court articulated the first interpretation of the harmless error
standard in 1946 in Kotteakos v. United States. The defendants were charged with a
single count of conspiracy even though the United States admitted that the evidence
actually pointed to multiple offenses with one central figure. The defendants claimed that
because of the error in the charge, the jury verdict had been prejudiced. The Court
reversed the conviction and focused on whether the error affected how the jury reached
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its verdict and whether it affected the defendant’s ―substantial rights.‖
In 1967, the Supreme Court extended the harmless error interpretation put forth in
Kotteakos by adding, ―the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction‖ (Chapman v. California,
1967). The Chapman defendants claimed to have been denied their constitutional rights
when the prosecutor’s continuous adverse references to their failure to testify implied that
they were guilty. The Court held that the repeated references were not harmless error and
the verdict was overturned.
In Harrington v. California (1969), the defendant claimed he was denied his
constitutional rights to confront his accusers when two co-defendants who confessed and
placed him at the scene of the crime did not testify. The Supreme Court ruled that this
constitutional error was harmless because the other evidence against the defendant was
overwhelming. Three justices dissented and argued that the state had not proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that the confessions had no effect on the verdict. The majority
opinion opted for the second interpretation of the harmless error standard and decided
that the remaining evidence without the error was enough to convict, while the dissent
followed the standard set forth in Chapman.
In Neder v. United States, a 1999 Supreme Court case, the jury was not instructed
on one of the elements of the crime. The Court narrowly ruled that ―the harmless-error
inquiry with respect to a failure by the trial court to instruct on an element of the charged
offense…is whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have
found the defendant guilty absent the error.‖
Depending on the actual error, the Court has vacillated between looking at the
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effect the error had on the jury’s decision versus looking at how a hypothetical jury
would have ruled without the error. With the case of Neder, it seems the court has
decided to focus on what a hypothetical jury would do in the face of the other evidence
minus the error and not on the effect the error had on the jury’s verdict.
A possible reason for the variation is the difficulty in determining whether a piece
of evidence entered through error had an effect on the jury’s verdict (Cooper, 2002). The
reviewing judges do not have the opportunity to sit in the courtroom and hear all the
nuances of the case; they are instead reviewing the case from the record. The reviewing
judges must rely on the trial judge’s view of the evidence presented at trial. It seems
nearly impossible for reviewing judges to determine the effect that evidence entered in
error had on the specific jury without also thinking about the other evidence and what the
verdict might have been if the error had not come in to the proceedings. If the evidence
against the defendant is strong, one could argue that the erroneous piece of evidence had
no further effect, but there would be no real way of knowing whether that one piece of
evidence prejudiced the rest of the evidence for the sitting juror.
The fact that these cases sometimes go through an appeals court that says ―yes the
instruction was sufficient‖ or ―no the instruction was not sufficient‖ only to be brought to
the Supreme Court and have them decide otherwise demonstrates that as a practical
matter there are few hard and fast rules defining what is or is not prejudicial. In fact,
what the court finds legally prejudicial, may not be actually prejudicial to jurors. Schul
and Goren (1997) found that strong inadmissible evidence actually had a weaker
prejudicial effect on the jury than did weak evidence. When the strong evidence was
admissible, participants, as expected, had higher judgments of guilt when compared to
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participants who had read the weak evidence. However, when participants were told to
ignore the strong evidence, they had lower judgments of guilt when compared to
participants who had read the weak evidence. Schul and Goren (1997) hypothesized that
their participants were ―overadjusting‖ their decisions when asked to ignore strong
evidence. This finding calls into question the courts’ ability to determine, after the fact,
whether a piece of evidence in a particular instance is prejudicial to the specific jury that
heard the evidence. Based on Schul and Goren’s (1997) findings, it seems a challenging
task to ask an appeals court to determine what effect even a seemingly innocuous remark
had on a jury.
Judicial Instructions
When a judge rules that evidence is inadmissible and orders a jury to disregard the
information the admonition can be classified as what Johnson (1994) calls a ―specific
forget instruction.‖ Johnson (1994) indicated that specific forget instructions are narrow
in scope and ask that one should forget specific parts of what one has learned. Johnson
(1994) suggested that people establish links between pieces of information particularly
when they are not informed beforehand that they will be expected to forget certain facts.
When these links occur, a juror would have a difficult time mentally separating the
inadmissible evidence from the admissible information because the inadmissible
evidence will have been encoded with the admissible evidence.
Demaine (2008) distinguishes between two traditional approaches to
admonishments used in the courtroom in an attempt to minimize prejudicial effects of
inadmissible evidence – the ―elaborate forget instruction‖ and the ―minimal forget
instruction‖. She argues there is an inherent problem in both approaches since they both
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literally ask the jurors to forget what they have heard – a difficult or impossible task
(Demaine, 2008).
An ―elaborate instruction‖ is one in which the judge specifically instructs the juror
to forget the evidence, to put it out of her mind, like it never existed (Demaine, 2008). A
―minimal forget instruction‖ by contrast uses the more terse ―disregard the witness’s last
answer‖ (Demaine, 2008, p. 104). The minimal instruction is thought to be beneficial
because it does not reaffirm the inadmissible evidence by referring to it.
Demaine suggests that rather than giving jurors the impossible task of forgetting
what they have heard, judicial instructions should instead aim to neutralize the bias
produced by the evidence. To test this hypothesis, Demaine (2008) gave participants one
of three instructions – a traditional elaborate forget instruction, a traditional minimal
forget instruction, and a neutralization instruction. The neutralization instruction alerted
jurors to the fact that the inadmissible evidence may bias their judgment even if they
thought they had disregarded it and they should adjust their verdict. Her results
suggested that participants in both the elaborate instruction and the neutralization
instruction groups responded similarly while those in the minimal instruction group more
closely resembled the group in which the evidence was admissible; thus, the minimal
instruction group had a more difficult time disregarding the evidence. This finding calls
into question the theory that an elaborate instruction draws unwanted attention to the
evidence.
Although Demaine found participants in the minimal forget group rated their
motivation to disregard at the same rate as the other inadmissible groups, they were less
aware of the impact of the evidence on their future judgments. Even though the
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instructions were different, members of both the elaborate instruction group and the
neutralization group used a neutralization method in order to reach their decision and
more effectively disregard the evidence (Demaine, 2008). This study points to the fact
that jurors may be able to disregard evidence even when the instructions ask them to
―forget‖ as long as the instructions are more explicit.
Theories regarding inability to disregard inadmissible evidence
Several theories provide partial explanations as to why limiting instructions may
be ineffective. For example, limiting instructions may be ineffective based on how the
information is encoded or stored by the people receiving the information (Johnson, 1994;
Schul & Burnstein, 1985). In addition, limiting instructions may be ineffective because
they make the information more salient (Wegner, 1994), or people are fighting to regain a
lost freedom (Brehm, 1966), or simply because people choose to ignore the instruction in
order to make a ―just verdict‖ (Kassin & Sommers, 1997). Whatever the reason, the
result is the same; sometimes people cannot disregard information when they are told to
do so.
Inability to disregard based on encoding strategies. Both Johnson (1994) and
Schul and Burnstein (1985) discuss the problems with discounting information based on
the way the information is encoded by the person receiving the information.
Intentional forgetting. Although Johnson (1994) did not discuss trials directly,
she would say that a limiting instruction asks an individual to engage in intentional
forgetting. Intentional forgetting is ―a motivated attempt to limit the future expression of
specific memory content‖ (Johnson, 1994, p.274). Three factors influence intentional
forgetting – how the information is initially encoded, how the forget instruction is
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processed, and the specificity of the information to be accessed later (Johnson, 1994).
Information can be encoded using either a learning strategy or a maintenance
strategy. An individual who does not expect to have to ignore information uses a
―learning strategy.‖ She assumes that she is allowed to use all the information she is
encountering and the information becomes part of memory. A person would then need to
use intentional forgetting in order to comply with a limiting instruction. However, if a
person is warned that she may need to ignore certain information, she could use what
Johnson calls a ―maintenance strategy.‖ In this case, the information is not immediately
integrated into memory, but instead held until a further instruction to remember or forget.
The type of forget instruction given is also a factor in whether the intentional
forgetting will be successful. A ―specific forget instruction‖ asks individuals to forget
only certain points of what they have learned (Johnson, 1994). When using a learning
strategy, the information gets integrated forming links and associations between all the
learned pieces. When given a specific forget instruction, the links do not break easily so
when recalling the items that need to be remembered, one may also recall the items to be
forgotten (Johnson, 1994).
The final factor for intentional forgetting is task execution. There is directed
retrieval and undirected retrieval (Johnson, 1994). Directed retrieval requires the person
to remember specific items from a learning task whereas undirected retrieval requires the
person to recall ―some information‖ which can be learned items or conclusions based on
the learned items (Johnson, p. 277). With a specific forget instruction, the retrieval
process does matter as the individual has been asked to remember some things but forget
others.
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Research supporting intentional forgetting. Most of the research focused on
intentional forgetting uses what is known as the list method (Bjork & Bjork, 1996).
Participants are given a list of words and told they may be asked to forget or they may be
asked to remember. In all instances, the participants start the task by thinking they have
to remember. Halfway through the list, the participant is cued to either forget the
preceding words and only remember the subsequent set (―forget-remember‖) or to
remember the preceding words and the subsequent (―remember-remember‖) (Bjork &
Bjork, 1996). The findings indicate that people are better at recalling subsequent list
items in the forget-remember condition than they are in the remember-remember
condition (Bjork & Bjork, 1996). The evidence suggests that once an individual is told to
forget preceding information, there is less cognitive load allowing for better memory of
subsequent items. However, following the word list, when participants were distracted
with a recognition task (i.e. ―were you supposed to remember this word?‖) that included
items to be forgotten, recall in the forget-remember condition decreased to the level of
the remember-remember condition (Bjork & Bjork, 1996). This is evidence that the
words are not actually ―forgotten‖ and once they are triggered in the recognition task,
they create static in the recall task.
An employer, to comply with fair hiring policies, may be asked to intentionally
forget information regarding an applicant’s sex, race, religion, etc. so as not to influence
hiring procedures. Oien and Goernert (2003) tested whether this was possible.
Participants received four job applications, one of which contained ―forbidden‖
information on the first page referred to as the ―Target‖ (Oien & Goernert, 2003). Some
participants were also pre-instructed about types of forbidden information that may
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appear on the application and told that that they should ignore this information. This was
an attempt to disrupt the encoding process. Although comparisons to the control group
that did not receive a pre-instruction indicated that participants who had been instructed
rated the Target as more favorable and recalled fewer items from the forbidden list,
overall the ―Target‖ applicant was viewed as less hire-able when compared to all other
applicants(Oien & Goernert, 2003). While the pre-instruction may have inhibited
integrative encoding or inhibited retrieval, it did not completely erase the influence of the
information.
One possible reason is that the participants were provided with seven pieces of
information on the first page of the Target application including items such as ―spent
night in detox‖ and ―has DUI conviction‖ while the comparative list for the other
applicants contained non-relevant (and banal) information such as ―has good health‖ and
―hobbies‖ (Oien & Goernert, 2003, p. 101). This study could be redone with either fewer
pieces of forbidden information mixed with non-relevant information or by including less
memorable forbidden items with fewer negative connotations in order to further test the
use of a pre-instruction to disrupt encoding.
The fact that so many studies involving intentional forgetting rely on the ―list
method‖ in a laboratory or some other scientific setting make them virtually
ungeneralizable. Oien and Goernert (2003) made a point of mentioning that they tried to
keep their materials as close to the ―list method‖ as possible. These studies occur in a
vacuum, asking people to remember or forget lists of words that have no meaning to each
other or to the participants; this is not realistic.
Application of intentional forgetting to inadmissible evidence. There are few
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studies that attempt to explore intentional forgetting in the courtroom setting, which is a
result of the difficultly in testing this type of hypothesis. Mallard and Perkins (2005)
hypothesized that participants would have a more difficult time separating admissible and
inadmissible testimony if it came from the same witness compared to if the same
testimony came from two separate witnesses. This hypothesis was based on the
intentional forgetting literature; Mallard and Perkins assumed that inadmissible and
admissible testimony that came from the same source would be encoded and associated
together in the mind of the participant, thus interfering with instructions to forget only
one piece of evidence presented by the witness. Using a trial summary adapted from
Kassin and Sommers (1997), Mallard and Perkins (2005) found their hypothesis was not
supported. The results indicated that it did not matter whether the two pieces of
testimony came from the same source or from different sources. Although there may
have been problems with the strength of the manipulation, this finding is promising
evidence that jurors can disregard specific items.
Discrete vs. integrative encoding. In another approach to encoding and
discounting, Schul and Burnstein (1985) discussed two types of encoding strategies –
discrete and integrative. In discrete encoding, arguments are stored separately with few
links to other arguments. In integrative encoding, arguments are stored together with
strong associations to other arguments. When an individual tries to discount information,
it seems logical to assume that discounting is easier if the original information was
encoded discretely. Discounting specific items within an integrative encoding strategy
requires associations between the arguments to be broken. Even if the information can be
discounted, the remaining information may have been interpreted with the information to
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be discounted.
Schul and Burnstein (1985) discuss two discounting contexts. In the first context,
the individual’s attention is focused on the information to be used. Individuals are told
which pieces of information they may attend to out of a whole set of information. In the
second context, the focus is on the information that is to be discounted. Individuals are
told which pieces of information they cannot use when reaching a decision. According to
Schul and Burnstein, in this second context, there is an increase in the salience of the
discounted information.
Schul and Burnstein (1985) hypothesized that discounting would fail when the
information had been encoded in an integrative process and when the individuals were
focused on the information to be disregarded. They hypothesized that asking the
individuals to ignore specific information would make that information more salient and
if they had used an integrative encoding strategy, that information would be linked to the
other information. Combined, these two situations should have made it difficult to
disregard the requested information. Schul and Burnstein found that discounting was
actually better when the focus was on the information to be ignored even though telling
participants to ignore it made the information more salient. However, it was only better
when a discrete encoding strategy had been used.
Application of discrete vs. integrative encoding to inadmissible evidence. Schul
and Manzury (1990) argue that appealing to jurors to discount information can work in a
courtroom because there is other testimony to support discounting. Because jurors are
aware that some of the testimony and evidence they hear may be invalid, integrative
encoding may actually be restrained in the courtroom, with jurors opting for a discrete
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method of encoding (Schul & Manzury, 1990).
Participants were presented with a trial summary where testimony from a
prosecution witness was invalidated by either weak testimony from defense witnesses or
through both the weak testimony and one strong testimony. Specifically to engage
participants in integrative encoding, Schul and Manzury (1990) asked participants to
think about how the testimonies they had heard fit together. The non-integrative
encoding group was asked to memorize the testimonies to be matched to the witness.
The results indicated that the type of encoding strategy did not affect ability to discount
the invalid prosecution testimony. Participants were also able to discount the
prosecution’s information regardless of the strength of the defense witnesses. An effect
for encoding strategy was found in the ratings of defendant aggressiveness when
compared to the control who was not asked to do anything additional with the testimony
(Schul & Manzury, 1990). This does suggest that the manipulation worked to some
extent.
Schul and Manzury (1990) argue that their findings are proof that jurors do not
need additional evidence in order to discount invalid testimony and that integrative
encoding did not affect discounting in the courtroom setting. However, it is possible that
the case against the defendant was weak in general so adding defense witnesses to
invalidate the prosecution’s star witness only served to make the case weaker. In
addition, the case involved an assault incident that occurred outside of a bar; the idea that
alcohol was involved in the assault may have led jurors to question the whole scenario.
As a result, the argument that encoding strategy does not matter and that jurors can
discount the testimony in a courtroom setting needs further examination.

18

Psychological Reactance Theory. One social psychological theory that may
account for the inability to disregard inadmissible evidence is psychological reactance
theory. Hammock and Brehm (1966) defined psychological reactance as ―a motivational
state directed toward the re-establishment of the eliminated freedom‖ (p. 546). At any
given point in time, a person has ―free behaviors‖ – these are thoughts, actions, or
decisions they can perform now or in the future (Brehm, 1966). In order for the behavior
to be free, Brehm states that the individual must be capable of engaging in those
behaviors both physically and psychologically. The individual must also be aware that
she can engage in those behaviors. This knowledge may be informal such as past
experience or general customs or it may be more formal such as a contract or agreement
between the parties (Brehm, 1966).
When an individual feels that one of her free behaviors is threatened or lost, the
individual may experience psychological reactance; however, it is not guaranteed that
reactance will occur when a free behavior is threatened or removed. Brehm indicates that
there are certain situations where reactance will be stronger. First, the strength of the
reactance is determined by the value of the threatened or lost free behavior and the value
of the alternative behaviors. If the behavior that is threatened or removed is seen as
highly valuable to the individual and the alternatives are viewed as less valuable, there
will be a stronger attempt to re-establish the lost freedom. Second, the number of free
behaviors that are being threatened or removed determines the strength of the reactance.
The number of threatened behaviors needed to arouse reactance is based on a proportion
of all the free behaviors available – if a large proportion of free behaviors are threatened,
reactance is more likely to be aroused. Finally, the reactance is determined by the
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strength of the threat; the stronger the threat, the stronger the reactance. According to
Brehm, reactance will not occur when there is no chance of recovering a lost freedom.
When an individual only has two choices and one is removed, the individual feels
she has essentially lost all freedom as there is only one choice remaining and it is either
pick that option or choose nothing. As a result, reactance is aroused and the lost
alternative becomes more desirable, while the only remaining option becomes less
desirable (Hammock & Brehm, 1966). The longing for the threatened free behavior
increases, which also increases that freedoms attractiveness (Brehm, 1966). In the case
of a trial, the free behavior is the ability to consider any information that the juror himself
deems relevant to the case. When a judge admonishes a jury to disregard specific
information, the free behavior is threatened, thus making the banned information more
attractive.
In an attempt to regain this lost freedom after being told to ignore evidence,
individuals may rely more heavily on the information than they would have if they had
been allowed to use it in the first place. This is known as the ―backfire effect.‖ In one of
the first studies to demonstrate the backfire effect, Broeder (1959) found that when jurors
were told a driver had liability insurance, they awarded the victim more than when they
knew the driver had no insurance. However, when the insurance information was ruled
inadmissible, jurors awarded the victim more than triple the original amount.
Research supporting psychological reactance theory. Psychological reactance
theory is often employed in the health education field. Psychological reactance has been
used as a framework to test the effectiveness of persuasive health messages on topics
ranging from binge drinking and drug use to exercise (Quick & Considine, 2008) and
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flossing (Dillard & Chen, 2005). If the health message evokes reactance, the individual
will fight to regain freedom, will ignore the message and will continue with selfdestructive behaviors. Within this framework, policymakers in the health field must find
a way to put forth an informative and persuasive message without arousing psychological
reactance.
Quick and Considine (2008) examined messages designed to persuade adults to
join exercise programs. One message contained forceful language regarding the health
problems in society and ended with ―you have to do it‖ (Quick & Considine, 2008,
p.491). The other message contained language that suggested people ―give it a try‖
(Quick & Considine, 2008, p. 491). Quick and Considine (2008) hypothesized that the
forceful message would be seen as a threat to freedom and participants would attempt to
regain the lost freedom. The findings showed that those in the forceful message
condition found the message less persuasive than those in the less forceful condition.
Those in the forceful message condition also reported that they would be less likely to
attend that particular exercise program. These findings suggest that when it comes to
health messages, people may respond more favorably to a gentler message where they
feel they have a choice.
Knowledge of psychological reactance can also be helpful when dealing with
children and teenagers. Driscoll, Davis, and Lipetz (1972) found that parental
interference increased feelings of romantic love in couples. When parental interference
decreased, feelings of romantic love decreased. Driscoll, et al. (1972) dubbed this
finding the Romeo and Juliet effect. A parent interfering in a relationship arouses
psychological reactance. In order to regain lost freedom, the teenager remains in the
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relationship. Once parental interference decreases, the threat to freedom is gone and so is
the relationship.
Application of psychological reactance theory to inadmissible evidence. Several
studies have tested reactance within the context of the courtroom, more specifically as
relating to inadmissible evidence. A judicial admonition to disregard information can be
viewed as a threat to freedom and as such, should arouse psychological reactance within
jurors.
Cox and Tanford (1989) found that jurors pay greater attention to, and rely more
heavily on, information after it has been ruled inadmissible. Wolf and Montgomery
(1977) found that when inadmissible evidence was accompanied by a weak admonition,
it did not bias the verdicts. However, when the evidence was followed by a strong
admonition, the admonition did produce biasing effects. One possible explanation for
this backfire effect is that the judge’s strong admonition was viewed as a greater threat to
freedom, which resulted in a reliance on the evidence in an attempt to regain that lost
freedom.
Similar to Wolf and Montgomery (1977), Lee, Krauss, and Lieberman (2005)
manipulated the strength of the judicial admonition following the introduction of hearsay
evidence in a civil trial. Evidence of psychological reactance was found in two measures
– confidence in liability verdicts and the award of punitive damages (Lee et al., 2005). In
both measures, those in the strong admonition condition were significantly different from
those in the weak admonition condition. Those who heard a strong admonition were
more confident in the plaintiff’s case and were more likely to award punitive damages.
Despite these findings, Lee et al. (2005) did not find differences in the actual
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liability verdicts or in the amounts awarded for compensatory and/or punitive damages.
Although a strong admonition may have aroused psychological reactance and influenced
the participants’ confidence in favor of the plaintiff, it did not affect the actual verdict.
The lack of significant differences in verdicts may be explained by the case itself.
Overall, a large majority of the verdicts, including 80% of participants in the control
condition, were in favor of the plaintiff.
Clark (1994) found that psychological reactance was aroused when the judge
censored a minority opinion during jury deliberations. Participants read that the judge
had learned one juror had discussed inadmissible evidence during deliberations. The
juror had made three arguments in favor of acquittal. In the highest level of censorship,
participants were informed that jury had been instructed to ignore two out of the three
arguments and that the juror had been removed from deliberations. Participants in this
strongest condition were least likely to think the defendant was guilty when compared to
all other conditions, including two different censorship conditions (Clark, 1994).
Interestingly, those who had only had one argument censored were no different on
probability of guilt ratings when compared to the group who did not have any arguments
censored.
Clark attributed these results to psychological reactance; however, the only
dependent measure was a 9-point Likert scale rating the probability of guilt. With no
other dependent measures to operationalize ―psychological reactance,‖ it is difficult to
draw that conclusion. Perhaps the juror being removed from deliberations drew attention
to the minority’s argument more so then just being told to disregard.
Theory of ironic mental processes. A second social psychological theory that
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could account for the inability to disregard inadmissible evidence is the theory of ironic
mental processes (Wegner, 1994). Wegner’s theory states that in order to control one’s
thoughts, one must not be distracted or stressed, under time pressure or increased
cognitive load. When a person has reduced mental capacity due to other pressures, not
only will the individual be unable to control the mental process, but also any attempt to
do so will have the opposite effect. Wegner calls this phenomenon the rebound effect.
Wegner’s (1994) theory assumes two processes for mental control: an operating
process; and, an ―ironic‖ monitoring process. The operating process requires conscious
effort and is the process that searches the mind for the thoughts or memories that will
produce the desired result. The effort-requiring operating process works in tandem with
the relatively unconscious monitoring process. The monitoring process searches the
mind for any thoughts or memories that will not produce the desired results. When the
monitoring process finds content that demonstrates a lack of mental control, it is a signal
to restart the operating process in an attempt to return to the desired results. Because the
monitoring process is relatively automatic, items that indicate a lack of control come into
consciousness and with conscious effort are suppressed by the operating process.
However, if the individual is suffering from cognitive overload, the operating process
will be impaired and the thoughts that should be suppressed will remain in the
consciousness. This is the irony of the process – the mind, in an attempt to suppress
certain thoughts, actually brings these thoughts into consciousness and increases their
accessibility.
Asking a juror to disregard information is asking the juror to suppress a thought.
The desired result is not to think of the piece of evidence. What makes this difficult is
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the fact that the operating process, in order to achieve the desired result, needs to search
the mind for everything but that thought – a ―feature negative search‖ (Wegner, 1994).
Meanwhile, the monitoring process has the easier job of searching for that thought – a
―feature positive search.‖ A juror may want to comply with the judge’s admonishment,
but may be unable to do so due to the reality of ironic mental processes.
Lieberman and Arndt (2000) suggested that jurors are likely to distract themselves
with other case relevant information. By using courtroom-related distractors, the juror
unintentionally links the inadmissible evidence to other case information. As Johnson
(1994) suggested, once information is linked, a specific forget instruction provided by a
judge fails to ensure separation of the evidence. Also, further efforts to suppress the
information may lead to the backfire effect, as the evidence will become more salient in
the mind of the juror. Consequently, the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions may
actually be a function of jurors trying to comply with those instructions.
Research supporting theory of ironic mental processes. The classic test of the
theory of ironic mental processes is the white bear experiment (Wegner, Schneider,
Carter, & White, 1987). Participants were assigned to a suppression condition or an
expression condition. In the suppression condition, participants were first told to ―not
think of a white bear‖ during a 5-minute stream of consciousness; they were then told
they should think of a white bear during a subsequent 5-minute stream of consciousness.
Those in the expression condition were instructed in the reverse order – first told to think
of the white bear, followed by instructions to suppress the thoughts. In all conditions,
participants were told to ring a bell whenever they mentioned or thought of a white bear.
Those who were first told to suppress, then allowed to think about the white bear
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had an increase in bell rings over their second 5-minute stream of consciousness (Wegner
et al., 1987). In all other time periods, participants decreased bell-ringing over the 5
minutes suggesting that thoughts of the white bear were there initially, but lessened over
time. This is evidence of the rebound effect. After suppressing the thought of a white
bear for a 5 minute time period, participants thought about the white bear at a much
higher rate than the other groups in the subsequent 5 minutes.
Application of theory of ironic mental processes to inadmissible evidence.
Edwards and Bryan (1997) found that the rebound effect described by Wegner et al.
(1987) was worse when participants were asked to suppress emotionally charged
inadmissible evidence when compared to participants asked to suppress the same
information that had no emotional aspect. The theory of ironic mental processes would
predict that any attempt to suppress information would result in a rebound effect.
Edwards and Bryan (1997) hypothesized that trying to suppress the emotional evidence
only served to make it more accessible and more likely to influence future judgments.
“Just verdict” hypothesis. The problem with the above theories in the jury
decision-making literature is that they predict the same outcome -- an unconscious
inability to disregard inadmissible evidence – through very different processes. For
example, it has been shown that mock jurors rely more heavily on information after it has
been ruled inadmissible (Cox & Tanford, 1989, Wolf & Montgomery, 1977 Lee et al.,
2005, Clark, 1994). Psychological reactance theory explains this ―backfire effect‖ by
claiming that the stronger the threat to freedom, the more the individual will try to restore
that freedom, thus relying more heavily on inadmissible evidence. The theory of ironic
mental processes explains this ―rebound effect‖ by claiming the more someone tries to
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suppress a thought, the more accessible that thought will become. In the first instance,
the individual is rebelling; in the latter, the individual is attempting to comply, but the
result is the same and hard to test because the processes are unconscious.
Kassin and Sommers (1997) proposed another theory, the ―just verdict
hypothesis,‖ which is not based on previous social psychological theories and is
specifically aimed at understanding how juror motivation influences the ability or
inability to disregard information. They argued that jurors comply with limiting
instructions on a selective basis. Jurors are motivated ―to render a ―just‖ verdict,
regardless of whether this decision conforms to the rules of evidence‖ (Sommers &
Kassin, 2001, p 1369). Jurors are faced with what can sometimes be a contradictory task;
they are asked to render justice, but they are also asked to uphold the applicable law
(Demaine, 2008). Sometimes these tasks conflict with each other, especially when a
juror is told to disregard evidence that she sees as relevant and reliable. It is interesting in
the quotation from Justice White above that he refers to his confidence in a jury’s ability
to disregard ―unreliable information‖ but sometimes, inadmissible evidence is reliable,
just not legally allowed.
Research supporting “just verdict” hypothesis. Testing the ―just verdict‖ theory,
Kassin and Sommers (1997) examined whether jurors would ignore information ruled
inadmissible for lacking credibility, but not ignore evidence ruled inadmissible for
violating due process. Research participants were introductory psychology students in
the role of non-deliberating mock jurors. Each participant read one of four versions of a
23-paragraph murder trial summary (Kassin & Sommers, 1997). Following each
paragraph, the individual jurors rated whether the paragraph had made the defendant
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seem innocent or guilty by using a digital dial in front of them. The control version of
the summary contained weak, circumstantial evidence. The remaining three versions
contained an illegal wiretap obtained from an unrelated case in which the defendant
confessed to the murder (Kassin & Sommers, 1997). In one version, the wiretap was
admissible. In the remaining two versions, the wiretap was inadmissible for reasons of
due process or for reasons of reliability.
The jurors showed selective compliance with the judge’s admonitions. In fact, the
inadmissible/unreliable group had the same conviction rate as the control group (24%)
(Kassin & Sommers, 1997). After the wiretap was introduced, those in the
inadmissible/due process group were more likely than both the control group and the
inadmissible/reliability group to vote guilty on the digital dial on subsequent items of
evidence even though they did not later cite the evidence as having swayed their
decisions (Kassin & Sommers, 1997). Jurors may think that they are complying with the
instructions without realizing that the evidence is affecting future judgments. This study
suggests that jurors can comply with limiting instructions and discount evidence on cue,
but they do so on a selective basis.
Pickel (1995) found some support for the just verdict hypothesis. Jurors were
better able to follow instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence when the evidence
was hearsay, which is a form of unreliable evidence, than they were when the evidence
was a prior conviction, which was inadmissible for due process reasons. However, as
pointed out by Kassin and Sommers, the results were from two separate studies and so
the evidence manipulation may not be the full reason for the difference between the two.
Interestingly, Mallard and Perkins (2005), which started as a test of intentional
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forgetting, ended as support for the just verdict hypothesis. If the evidence was ruled
inadmissible because it was unreliable, the participants were able to ignore it regardless
of whether the source provided both admissible and inadmissible testimony or solely
inadmissible testimony.
Use of instructions to reduce the influence of inadmissible evidence
Regardless of the theory, all of the above psychological processes lead to the
same result – individuals have trouble ignoring or forgetting information once they have
heard it. One possible solution is to offer an instruction; however, it is not just an
instruction that is important; it is the timing and the content of that instruction. An
instruction offered prior to receiving information may be more helpful than receiving an
instruction after exposure to the information and an instruction that addresses
psychological realities could have a different effect than one that does not.
Timing of instructions to reduce the influence of inadmissible evidence.
Schul (1992) hypothesized that by giving people a warning that they may not be required
to use all the upcoming information, they may hold off on combining all the information
and only evaluate the evidence once they have learned which of the pieces was ―invalid.‖
By examining pieces of evidence as distinct pieces of information not to be combined
until one is sure she is using only admissible evidence could improve a juror’s ability to
disregard inadmissible information.
Schul (1992) had participants read eight pieces of information regarding a
fictional person and make judgments about the person following the reading. Some
participants were warned ahead of reading the information that some of the descriptors
might not be valid and would have to be ignored at the end of the reading. Participants
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were not told until afterward which descriptors were to be ignored. Other participants
received not only this early warning but also a reminder during the reading. The
reminder was not explicit, but a bizarre descriptor, which was meant to serve as a
reminder that not all the material was valid. Schul (1992) hoped to break the integrative
process such that integration only occurred after all information had been provided and
some marked as invalid. The ability to disregard information was increased when
participants received both an early warning and a reminder later on (Schul, 1992).
Because participants were told at the onset that some pieces of information were meant to
be ignored, they may have demonstrated demand characteristics in an attempt to comply
with the researcher’s instructions. However, the group that received only the early
warning, but not the reminder, actually did slightly worse in ignoring the information
than did a group that received no warning at all, suggesting that the results are not due to
demand characteristics. Only when participants read the early warning and the reminder
in the form of bizarre information was discounting successful.
This finding can be applied to the courtroom in the form of a pre-trial jury
instruction. A judge could instruct the jury before they hear any evidence concerning the
possibility that some evidence may be inadmissible and they may be instructed to
disregard this evidence. The judge could go even further by indicating that each piece of
evidence received should be regarded separately until the end of the trial. Johnson’s
(1994) notion of ―specific forget instructions‖ suggests that a juror who is encouraged to
process pieces of evidence separately may be better able to specifically forget one
particular piece of information, i.e. that which is inadmissible. The ―reminder‖ occurs in
the trial and comes in the form of the judicial admonition immediately following the
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introduction of the inadmissible evidence and subsequent ruling and again at the end of
trial instructions. Thus, in practice, jurors often receive two post-evidence reminders; but
rarely do they receive a pre-trial evidence warning. This is an idea that is relatively
absent from the literature, but could have some interesting implications on judicial
instructions.
Cruse and Brown (1987) studied the effect of timing of legal definitions,
specifically the definition of grand larceny. Either participants heard the definition
before the testimony, after the testimony, before and after the testimony, or they did not
hear a definition. Timing – before or after - had no effect, but the group that received the
definition twice was significantly different from the other groups. This is an indication
that it may not matter when a juror hears the information; what matters is how many
times the juror hears it. This is similar to what Schul (1992) found in that participants
were better able to disregard information when they received an early instruction and
were given a reminder later.
Kassin and Wrightsman (1979) found that jurors who received instructions prior
to the trial regarding the burden of proof and reasonable doubt were less likely to convict
when compared to participants who only received the instructions afterward or not at all.
Timing of the instruction had no significant effect between groups on ratings of evidence
strength or interpretations of reasonable doubt. Participants in the pre-instruction
condition thought it less likely that the defendant was guilty (Kassin & Wrightsman,
1979). Kassin and Wrightsman concluded that participants in the pre-instruction
conditions presumed the defendant was innocent while the other presumed he was guilty.
In this study, the participants were instructed after the opening statements and before the

31

start of the evidence. No group received the instructions both before and after the
evidence was presented, so the effects of repetition on the participants’ verdicts could not
be tested.
Paglia and Schuller (1998) presented participants with hearsay evidence and one
of two instructions – limiting, which allowed the evidence in, but limited its use, and
disregard, which admonished jurors to ignore the evidence. The instruction was
presented either right after the testimony, at the end of the trial, or in both places.
Additionally, there were three control conditions – the witness presented the evidence as
firsthand rather than hearsay, no hearsay evidence was admitted, or the hearsay evidence
was admitted without objection or instruction. There were no differences across the
manipulated variables for verdict or strength of case (Paglia & Schuller, 1998). One
possibility for this is that the defense introduced alibi evidence demonstrating that the
defendant was somewhere else at the time of the murder. With a weak case and hearsay
evidence, which can be viewed as unreliable regardless of whether it was allowed or not,
the strength of the case diminished and resulted in not guilty verdicts.
Steblay, Hosch, Culhane, and McWethy (2006) conducted a meta-analysis
examining how judicial instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence impact juror
verdicts. They found that inadmissible evidence led to more guilty verdicts even with an
immediate judicial admonition. However, when evidence was ruled admissible there
were more guilty verdicts than when the same evidence was deemed inadmissible (n=16).
The effect of inadmissible evidence was diminished when the judge explained why the
evidence was not reliable (n=3), if a general judicial instruction was given at the end of
the trial (n=3), during jury deliberation (n=4), and for hearsay evidence (n=5). Evidence
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that was objected to and ruled inadmissible made for more guilty verdicts suggesting that
the objection and inadmissible ruling alone have an adverse impact. The judge’s charge
at the end of the trial was moderately effective at reducing the effect of inadmissible
evidence. Interestingly, groups that did not hear any inadmissible evidence (n = 4) but
still heard an end of trial charge still had an increased rates of conviction. There was
some evidence that a pre-trial instruction affected the impact of inadmissible evidence,
but the data set contained a small number of this type of experimental design and in two
of the four studies, the pre-trial instruction related to pre-trial publicity as the
inadmissible evidence and not evidence presented in the trial.
Throughout the meta-analysis, Steblay et al. (2006) analyzed the impact of
moderator variables, such as type of evidence, reason for inadmissibility and type of case.
The meta-analysis revealed some support for the ―just verdict‖ hypothesis. For example,
evidence that was illegally obtained had a statistically significant impact on verdicts;
however, it was not the main focus of the analysis and in some analyses, the number of
studies used was very small due to a separation of so many moderating variables. Since
the focus was on judicial instruction and inadmissible evidence, the only studies included
were those in which a judicial instruction was used in the experimental design; this
reduced the sample size sometimes to the point of using n = 1 to look for effects. With
small sample sizes for several of the analyses, the results are not conclusive and there is
room for further investigation.
Content of instructions – use of suspicion to reduce the influence of
inadmissible evidence. Although an instruction prior to the start of a trial, followed by a
reminder, may reduce bias from inadmissible evidence, a further step would be to raise a
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juror’s awareness by arousing suspicion about motives behind behavior. Fein and his
colleagues have conducted numerous studies regarding the arousal of suspicion and its
effect on decision-making. Hilton, Fein, and Miller (1993) define suspicion as
entertaining ―the notion that the target is trying to hide something that has the potential to
discredit the meaning of the target’s behavior‖ (p 502). Once suspicion is aroused,
judgment is reserved because the individual is actively entertaining ―multiple, plausibly
rival hypotheses about the motives or genuineness of a behavior‖ (p 502). When
someone is suspicious, she is less likely to take behavior at face value and instead will
hold the actor to a higher standard of proof before belief (Fein, 1996). Once suspicious,
the individual may view everyone involved as having ulterior motives and not just the
person the suspicion is directed toward (Fein). An individual who is suspicious may
attend to and process information more carefully. Fein, Morgan, Norton, and Sommers
(1997) suggest that suspicion is effective at increasing one’s ability to discount
information without the need to forget that information. In order to do this, the reason to
be suspicious must be compelling and must make jurors question the legitimacy of the
evidence (Fein, et al, 1997).
Fein, McCloskey, and Tomlinson (1997) claimed that raising suspicion does not
elicit the same psychological reactance that may occur after a judicial instruction. This is
because jurors are not being asked to forget or ignore instructions; they are only being
asked to think more seriously about the information they receive. The study stimulus was
designed to arouse suspicion about the motives of the prosecutor who introduced
inadmissible hearsay testimony. The study had four groups – a control group who did not
hear the testimony, an admissible group in which testimony was not objected to, an
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inadmissible group in which the testimony was objected to, but there was no attempt to
arouse suspicion, and an inadmissible group in which suspicion was aroused. This was
accomplished by having the defense attorney arouse suspicion within his objection by
saying: ―The prosecution has deliberately asked a question that was designed to elicit a
response that he knew would be inadmissible, your honor. Why else would he ask such a
question?‖ (Fein at al., 1997, p. 1222). The judge followed with an additional suspicionarousing statement after instructing the jury to disregard: ―You should also keep in mind
that sometimes inadmissible evidence is introduced into a trial in a deliberate attempt to
manipulate the jury's thinking, and you should therefore try not to let this information
affect your thinking about this case‖ (Fein at al., 1997, p. 1222). Those in the
inadmissible/suspicious condition rendered verdicts similar to the control group who had
not heard the evidence at all. Those in the inadmissible suspicious condition also rated
the truth of the hearsay evidence as significantly less than both the admissible and the
inadmissible/no suspicion conditions.
With both the defense attorney and the judge arousing suspicion, the participant is
being exposed to two people in a position of power telling them to be wary. It would
have also been interesting to see a condition in which either the judge only or the defense
attorney only raised suspicion. The results of the suspicious statements may also have
been a result of demand characteristic. Because the suspicion-arousing statements
occurred immediately following the inadmissible evidence, participants may have
unconsciously changed their answers in order to comply with what they thought the
experimenter was looking for in regards to that piece of evidence.
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Current study:
Judicial limiting instructions and the juror’s ability to disregard inadmissible
evidence.
Kassin and Sommers (1997) have shown that jurors will disregard inadmissible
evidence when the evidence is determined by the juror to be unreliable or irrelevant in
order to make a just verdict. The encoding literature shows that discounting works best
when pieces of information are attended to as separate items and not integrated until the
end. Schul has shown that when an individual is warned ahead of time that certain
information may need to be ignored later, the individual is better able to do so. Finally,
Fein and colleagues have shown that arousing suspicion can increase the ability to
discount information and minimize psychological reactance. These lines of research are
combined in the current study by using both a generic pre-trial instruction that warns of
possible inadmissible evidence, and a pre-trial instruction designed to arouse suspicion.
The current study tested and extended the just verdict hypothesis (Kassin &
Sommers, 1997). The just verdict literature supports the idea that jurors are trying to do
their job; yet, studies to date have not included a pre-trial instruction informing study
participants what that job is. As such, the participants are not told to disregard
information until after they have been exposed to it. In most cases, participants are also
not told they are only allowed to consider only admissible evidence when making their
decision until the closing instruction by the judge. This study introduced a judicial pretrial instruction, including one designed to raise suspicion, to examine with more
specificity when jurors might disregard unreliable inadmissible evidence and under what
conditions they can ignore reliable inadmissible evidence. By placing the suspicionarousing instruction at the beginning of the trial, the current study hoped to reduce any
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specific demand characteristic by making the suspicion generalized and not focused on
any one person or piece of evidence.
Both New York and California include a sentence on evidence that is to be
ignored in their recommended pre-trial criminal law instructions. Recommended New
York State Criminal Jury Instructions state: ―Testimony which was stricken from the
record or to which an objection was sustained must be disregarded by you‖ (CJI2d[NY]
Charges of General Applicability). California Criminal Jury Instructions state: ―If I order
testimony stricken from the record, you must disregard it and must not consider that
testimony for any purpose‖ (CALCRIM No. 104, 2009, p. 92).
A simple generic pre-instruction given at the beginning of a lengthy trial may be
forgotten long before any controversial evidence is admitted into the trial. In order to
bolster the pre-instruction, this study also examined a more comprehensive judicial preinstruction with the purpose of raising juror suspicion regarding the reasons why a lawyer
may try to introduce known to be inadmissible. For the purpose of this research, the term
―suspicion‖ is used to refer to raising participants’ awareness and making them more
critical of the evidence. Even though this type of judicial pre-instruction about suspicion
may be less likely used in a courtroom, its purpose here was to examine whether jurors
will disregard inadmissible evidence regardless of whether it is due process related or
unreliable and may as a result give more thought to other, admissible, evidence.
Design
The design is a 3 (type of pre-trial instruction) x 5 (type of ruling) design –
resulting in 15 experimental conditions. This is a complete factorial design. The judicial
instructions factor included no instruction (no instruction), a generic pre-trial instruction
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(generic), and a suspicious pre-trial instruction (suspicious). The type of ruling factor
included no objection (no objection), an overruled objection with no further admonition
from the judge (admitted - no admonition), an overruled objection with a further
admonition (admitted – admonition), a sustained objection because the evidence is
unreliable (not admitted – unreliable), and a sustained objection because the evidence
was stricken prior to the trial with a motion, due process violation (not admitted – DP).
See Table 1 for condition combinations and sample sizes.

Table 1. Condition combinations with sample sizes.
Type of ruling

Type of
instruction

Admitted

Not Admitted

No
Objection

Admitted – no
admonition

Admitted admonition

Not admitted
- unreliable

Not
admitted DP

No Instruction

1 (16)*

2 (16)

3 (16)

4 (16)

5 (16)

Generic

6 (16)

7 (16)

8 (16)

9 (17)

10 (16)

Suspicious

11 (16)

12 (16)

13 (16)

14 (16)

15 (16)

* Sample sizes in parentheses.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1. There will be a main effect for type of instruction. See Table 2.

participants in the suspicious condition should return fewer guilty verdicts and be
less confident that the defendant is guilty when compared to the other instruction
conditions individually (Fein et al., 1997).
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participants in the suspicious condition should find everyone – attorneys and
witnesses - less trustworthy and honest when compared to the other instruction
conditions individually.
participants in the suspicious condition will find the evidence less convincing
compared to the other two instruction conditions individually.
Participants in the generic condition will have fewer guilty verdicts compared to
the no instruction condition.

Controlling for type of instruction:
Hypothesis 2. The ―just verdict‖ hypothesis (Kassin & Sommers, 1997) suggests
the not admitted – unreliable condition should be significantly different from each of the
other type of ruling conditions such that participants in the not admitted – unreliable
condition should:

have fewer guilty verdicts
think it less likely the defendant committed the crime
find the State’s evidence to be weaker and less convincing
be more convinced by the defense

Hypothesis 3. The not admitted conditions will be significantly different from
the admitted conditions. When the evidence is not admitted, participants should:

have fewer guilty verdicts
think it less likely the defendant committed the crime
find the State’s evidence to be weaker and less convincing

39

be more convinced by the defense
Hypothesis 4. The admitted – no admonition conditions will be significantly
different from the admitted – admonition conditions. Those in the admitted – admonition
conditions will:

view the witness presenting the critical evidence as less confident and less
credible
think it less likely the defendant committed the crime

To test hypotheses 3 and 4, the five-factor Type of Ruling variable will be
contrast coded to test four contrasts:

no objection vs. all others
admitted vs. not admitted
admitted – no admonition vs. admitted – admonition
not admitted – unreliable vs. not admitted – DP

Hypothesis 5. Participants in the no instruction condition will demonstrate the
―just verdict‖ effect. As such, the predictions for the no instruction condition are the
same as set out in Hypothesis 2. Under the no instruction condition, the not admitted –
unreliable condition should be significantly different from each of the other types of
ruling conditions such that participants in the not admitted – unreliable condition should:

have fewer guilty verdicts
think it less likely the defendant committed the crime
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find the State’s evidence to be weaker and less convincing
be more convinced by the defense
Hypothesis 6. Participants in the generic condition will show a reduced ―just
verdict‖ effect such that:

the admitted conditions will be significantly different from the not admitted
conditions on ratings of guilt, likelihood, and strength of evidence
The not admitted – unreliable and not admitted – DP conditions will no longer be
different from one another

Hypothesis 7. Participants in the suspicious condition will have a further
reduction of the ―just verdict‖ effect. Under the suspicious condition, the no objection
and admitted - no admonition conditions will be significantly different from the admitted
– admonition, not admitted – unreliable, and not admitted – DP conditions.
If the suspicious condition does not reduce the ―just verdict‖ effect as predicted,
there will still be an effect. Those in the suspicious/admitted – admonition condition will
view the evidence as unreliable. As such, under the suspicious condition, those in the
admitted – admonition condition will respond as the not admitted – unreliable do and will
be significantly different from the remaining three type of ruling conditions.
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Chapter 2. Method

Pilot
A pilot was conducted in Manhattan civil and criminal courts during a one-week
period between 12/07/09 - 12/09/09. In total, 20 people participated. See Appendix A
for a complete discussion of changes to methodology and materials due to the pilot
results. Based on the pilot a number of changes were made to the stimulus trial to
maximize the distinctions between the conditions and the clarity of the trial summary.
Additionally, due to problems that arose for the pilot participants with the audio
technology and the logistics of the jury facilities available, the method of delivery was
changed from an audio version to a written version.
Participants
Two hundred fifty one participants (89 men, 145 women, 17 sex missing, Mage =
43, age range: 19 – 75) were recruited with a verbal request for voluntary participants in
the Staten Island Jury Assembly Room from 3/23/2010 to 6/2/2010. Ten participants’
data were discarded due to missing data – most looked as though they had accidentally
skipped an entire page of the questionnaire. 241 participants remained (86 men, 141
women, 14 sex missing, Mage = 43, age range: 19 – 75).
Participants were solicited only after it was known to the staff that the jurors were
being dismissed from jury service. The participants either had not been questioned for a
jury or may have been questioned for a jury, but were not selected. No jurors who were
waiting for voir dire or who were serving on a case could be used. This rule was applied
to avoid any possibility that the research might taint a real trial. Only completely
dismissed jurors were invited to participate. Participants were not compensated
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financially. They were welcome to keep the pen and a lollipop for their time.
Participation took approximately 30 minutes.
Materials
Trial summary. Individual participants were randomly assigned to one of the
fifteen conditions and presented with a written trial summary. Ten conditions received a
judicial pre-trial instruction prior to the summary. All fifteen conditions included
opening statements, descriptions of witness testimony, closing statements, and closing
judicial instructions. See Table 2 for the order of the trial summary and the content of the
testimony.
The stimulus material was a modified version of a trial summary used by Kassin:
State of Arizona v. John Gardner. In the trial summary, the defendant, John Gardner,
was accused of murdering a young woman, Carrie Reese. The defendant had come
through town with his girlfriend and decided to attend a party with some local kids. He
was the last person seen with the victim. The defendant admitted that he was with her
when questioned by the police. In total, there were six witnesses for the state and three
witnesses for the defense, including the defendant. See Appendix B for the full trial
summary.
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Table 2. Order of trial summary and content of witness testimony.
Order of
trial
summary

Witness

Cell
numbers
(n)

Content

1-5
No instruction
(80)
Judge’s pretrial
instructions

6-10
Generic
(81)
11-15
Suspicious
(80)

Opening
Statements

All

Detective
Collins
Two State
witnesses:*

Pathologist,
Dr. Mark
Friedland

D recognized photo of
victim; admitted to fooling
around with her
All

Cause of death was a
severe blow to the head –
no cross-exam

Dr. Jerome
Michaels

1,6,11
No objection
(48)

Hair found under the
victim’s fingernail matched
the D’s; did not offer DNA
evidence:

Forensic
expert

Three State
witnesses:*

Store clerk,
Joshua
Campbell

Saw the D hug the victim
upon leaving his store;
could not tell whether they
left together

Antonia Kirby

Saw the D’s truck near
crime scene with someone
sleeping in the back; could

Objection - no
reason

Admitted – no
admonition

Objection - no
reason

Admitted –
admonition to give
it the weight it
deserves

Objection research
claimed hair
match
unreliable

Not admitted

Objection - pretrial motion to
exclude
evidence

Not admitted

2,7,12
(48)
3,8,13
(48)

4,9,14
(49)

5,10,15
(48)

All
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not positively ID the
defendant

Three
Defense
witnesses:*

James
Webster

Saw the D and victim
arguing at the party; saw
the D leave with victim

Deborah
Sloan

Described the D as
―normal‖ the day after the
murder – no cuts or bruises

Lisa Marie
Page

Confirmed D was in the
apartment the morning
after and does not have a
violent temper; has never
know him to black out

Defendant,
John Gardner

Admits he fooled around
with a girl, blacked out,
and drove back to the
apartment; showered when
he got back

All

Closing
statements

All

Judge’s
closing
instructions

All

Critical evidence. The critical evidence was that of a hair found underneath the
victim’s fingernails, which matched a sample from the defendant. When the forensic
expert, Dr. Jerome Michaels, introduced the hair evidence in the trial summary, it was
immediately followed by the lawyer’s objection to that evidence and the judge’s ruling.
When the critical evidence was introduced by the State, all participants read the
following paragraph:
State: The next witness is Dr. Jerome Michaels, a forensics
expert who tested the victim’s body and clothing for
foreign hairs, fibers, and other trace evidence. Dr.
Michaels reports his laboratory findings that a hair sample
positively matched that of the defendant. He also testifies
that the hair was recovered from underneath the victim’s
fingernail and that there were no other foreign hairs on the
body.
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Following this paragraph, all conditions except not admitted – due process read
the following paragraph from the defense:
Defense: On cross-examination, forensic expert Dr.
Michaels testifies that he knew the hair was a match to the
defendant because he compared a hair sample from the
defendant to the hair found beneath the victim’s fingernail
under a microscope.

See Table 3 and Table 4 for the wording of the remaining manipulation
paragraphs and Table 5 for a summary of the objections and rulings.
Although it may seem unlikely that in a trial summary one would include the
inadmissible evidence, the participants were told they were reading a summary of the
entire trial proceedings.
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Table 3. Wording of defense cross-examination of forensic expert Dr. Jerome Michaels.
Condition
No
objection

Admitted
– no
admon

Admitted
– admon

Not admit
– unreliable

Not
admittDP

Defense:
On cross-examination, forensic expert
Dr. Michaels admits he is aware of a
recent study by a major scientific
organization stating that matching hair
samples under a microscope is unreliable
as a source of identification. He also
testifies that hair matching is wrong
around 12% of the time.
On cross-examination, he admits that a
―match‖ indicates that the hair likely
belongs to the defendant, but cannot rule
out the possibility of someone else
At this point, the defense objects to the
forensic testimony of Dr. Michaels
At this point, the defense objects to the
forensic testimony of Dr. Michaels and
asks that the hair evidence be stricken
from the record due to the unreliable
nature of this evidence
At this point, the defense objects to the
forensic testimony of Dr. Michaels and
asks that the last part of the witness’s
testimony be stricken from the record. A
motion was granted prior to the start of
the trial that this witness was not to
mention where the hair was recovered
from.

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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Table 4. Wording of Judge’s ruling.
Condition
No
objection

Admitted
– no
admon

Admitted
– admon

Not admit
– unreliable

Not
admittDP

X

X

Judge:
The objection is overruled. The forensic
testimony of Dr. Michaels will be
allowed to remain on the record.

X

The objection is overruled. The forensic
testimony of Dr. Michaels will be
allowed to remain on the record.
However, the jury is to give the
testimony only the weight they think it
deserves when reaching a verdict.

X

Objection is sustained. The jury is to
disregard the forensic testimony of Dr.
Michaels

Table 5. Summary of objections and rulings regarding the critical evidence.
Number of
conditions

Objection

Reason for objection

Ruling

No

N/A

N/A

3

Yes

No reason given

Admitted without further
admonition

3

Yes

No reason given

Admitted with further
admonition

3

Yes

Evidence is unreliable based on
research by a ―major scientific
organization‖

Not admitted

3

Yes

Introduction of the evidence
violated due process rights. The
evidence had been ruled
inadmissible prior to the trial.

Not admitted

3
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Procedure
Participants were brought into a room next door to the main jury assembly room.
They sat wherever they were comfortable. They were told to leave a chair in between
each other for more space to maneuver. After they were seated, each participant was
handed a manila envelope containing a pen, a consent form, the trial summary, and the
questionnaire (see Appendix E for the questionnaire and Appendix F for the consent
form). Participants were randomly assigned to a condition. Participants were told to first
complete the consent form; at this point, participants were allowed to ask any questions.
Signed consent forms were collected before the participants began to read the trial
summary. Participants read the summary, then answered the questionnaire, and returned
everything to the envelope. While answering the questionnaire, participants were able to
go back and look through the trial summary. From start to finish, participation took an
average of 29 minutes, with a range of 13 minutes to 57 minutes.
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Chapter 3. Results
Descriptive statistics
All 241 participants were from Richmond County, NY. Participants included 86
men (36%), 141 women (59%), and 14 (5%) where sex data was missing. The average
age was 43 with a range from 19 – 75. Of the 219 who responded to the demographic
questions, 26% spoke another language in the home. The most common language was
Russian, followed by Spanish. Only 17% had ever served on a jury before and only 6%
were questioned for a jury on the day they participated. Participation took an average of
29 minutes, with a range of 13 minutes to 57 minutes. There were no significant
differences on verdict or confidence between those who finished quickly compared to
those who took longer.
On the dichotomous verdict question, 69% of participants decided the defendant
was ―not guilty.‖ Additionally, participants were asked to rate on a scale of 1-7 whether
they thought the defendant was ―definitely not guilty‖ to ―definitely guilty.‖ Overall, this
question returned M = 4.102 - a neutral verdict. Based on these results, most hypotheses
regarding guilty verdict were not significant.
Five additional variables were created from the dependent variables. The
dichotomous verdict was recoded with guilty as -1 and not guilty as +1. This variable
was then multiplied by the question regarding verdict confidence to create a scale ranging
from -10 to +10, with 10 indicating ―very confident the defendant is guilty‖ and +10
indicating ―very confident the defendant is not guilty.‖ Participants were asked to rate
the trustworthiness and competence of both attorneys, how manipulative each attorney’s
case was, and how convinced they were by each case. A difference variable was created
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for each pair by subtracting the rating of the Defense Attorney from the rating of the State
Attorney. See Table 6 for means and standard deviations for all dependent variables.
Two manipulation checks were included at the end of the questionnaire:
participants were asked whether any evidence was objected to and whether they had read
an instruction prior to the trial summary. Twenty-eight participants incorrectly said they
had read an instruction when they had not. No participants said they had not read an
instruction when they had. All participants read the following two sentences prior to the
trial summary: ―The purpose of this research is to understand the process of juror
decision-making. Please imagine that you are a juror in this criminal case as you
carefully read the trial summary.‖ It is possible that participants mistook this instruction
as an instruction from the judge. Thirty-two participants incorrectly said that no evidence
was objected to. No participant in the no objection conditions answered that evidence
was objected to. Since these incorrect answers did not affect the analyses, these
participants remained in the dataset.
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics for all dependent variables (numbers correspond to
number on questionnaire).
Dependent measure

Mean

SD

1. Guilt scale

4.102

1.694

2. Confidence

6.980

3. Likelihood D committed the crime

Mean

SD

11. Rating of Deborah Sloan’s honesty

7.24

1.940

2.216

12. Rating of Josh Campbell’s honesty

7.56

1.985

52.330

28.440

13. Rating of James Webster’s honesty

6.65

2.190

5a. Impact of Antonia Kirby’s
testimony on guilt

4.430

1.401

5.71

2.230

5b. Impact of the hair evidence on
guilt

5.100

1.287

15. Rating of the State Attorney’s
trustworthiness

6.97

2.072

5c. Impact of James Webster’s
testimony on guilt

4.56

1.414

16. Rating of the State Attorney’s
competence

6.69

2.247

5d. Impact of John Gardner’s
testimony on guilt

4.10

1.567

17. Rating of the Defense Attorney’s
trustworthiness

6.43

1.915

5e. Impact of Detective Collins’
testimony on guilt

4.11

1.383

18. Rating of the Defense Attorney’s
competence

6.89

1.892

5f. Impact of Lisa Marie Page’s
testimony on guilt

4.181

1.427

19. Rating of the state’s case as
manipulative

5.60

2.508

5g. Impact of Josh Campbell’s
testimony on guilt

4.118

1.400

20. Rating of the defense’s case as
manipulative

5.00

2.278

5h. Impact of Deborah Sloan’s
testimony on guilt

3.93

1.333

21. Rating of the fairness of the state’s
evidence

3.95

2.599

6. Evidence strength

4.803

2.732

22. Convinced by the state’s evidence

4.74

2.766

7a. Impact of Dr. Michaels’ testimony
on guilt

4.93

1.505

4.90

2.295

7b. Rating of Dr. Michaels’
credibility

6.78

2.447

7c. Rating of Dr. Michaels’
confidence

6.51

2.507

2.38

6.95

7.40

2.190

.55

2.280

9. Rating of Detective Collins’
honesty

7.21

2.278

-.17

2.63

10. Rating of Lisa Marie Page’s
honesty

6.93

2.185

State manipulation – Defense
manipulation

.58

3.07

Convinced by State – Convinced by
Defense

-.15

4.14

8. Rating of Antonia Kirby’s honesty

Dependent measure

14. Rating of John Gardner’s honesty

23. Convinced by the defense’s evidence

Created variables:
Verdict confidence scale

State trustworthiness - Defense
trustworthiness
State competence – Defense competence
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Hypothesis tests
The first hypothesis was that there would be a main effect for instruction such that
those in the suspicious condition would return fewer guilty verdicts and would be less
confident in their verdict. This hypothesis had mixed supported. As predicted, those in
the no instruction condition had the most guilty verdicts (n=29) followed by those who
read the generic instruction (n=23). Those in the suspicious group had the fewest guilty
verdicts (n=20), but the chi-square was not significant (χ2 = 2.626, p = .269, φ = .105).
See Figure 1.

Figure 1. Percent of participants voting guilty or not guilty by instruction type.

100%

63%

71%

74%
Not Guilty

50%

Guilty

37%

29%

26%

Generic

Suspicious

0%
No Instruction

It was also hypothesized that participants in the suspicious condition would view
everyone as less trustworthy when compared to the other instruction conditions. This
trend appeared in the means of the rating of the State Attorney, but again, the results were
not significant. This trend was not apparent in any of the ratings of witness honesty.
A one-way ANOVA did reveal a main effect for type of instruction on the
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question regarding the likelihood that the defendant committed the crime, F(2,223) =
3.565, p = .030, partial

2

= .031. Post hoc comparisons showed that the suspicious

group (M = 47.31, SD = 28.75) was significantly lower than the no instruction group (M
= 59.11, SD = 26.50) suggesting that those who had read the suspicious instruction
thought it less likely that the defendant had committed the crime when compared to the
control group. See Figure 2.
Figure 2. Average likelihood the defendant committed the crime by instruction type.
70
60
50
40
30

59.11
50.63

47.31

Generic

Suspicious

20
10
0
No Instruction

The second hypothesis was that, controlling for type of instruction, the ―just
verdict’ effect would be found. Based on the ―just verdict‖ hypothesis, if participants in
the not admitted – DP condition are unable to disregard the evidence, they should
perform the same as all the conditions in which the evidence was admissible. Also based
on this theory, participants in the not admitted - unreliable condition should be different
from the other conditions. Although this main effect was found in few of the dependent
variables, an examination of the means shows the trend that the not admitted - unreliable
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condition is the lowest mean on questions regarding guilt and the critical evidence. See
Table 7.
Table 7. Evidence of just verdict hypothesis in the means.
Dependent Measures

Verdict
scalea

Likely
committed
crimeb

Strength
of
evidencec

Impact of
forensic
expertd

Rating of
forensic
expert’s
credibilityc

Rating of
forensic
expert’s
confidencec

No
object

4.08

51.52

4.96

4.79

7.10

6.44

4.69

Admit
– no
admon

4.29

57.34

5.34

5.08

7.31

6.60

4.88

Admitadmon

4.41

55.63

5.46

4.92

7.02

6.72

5.26

Not
admitunrel

3.71

47.76

3.98

4.48*

5.57†

5.33†

4.19

Not
admit DP

4.02

49.58

4.29

5.40

6.94

7.49

4.70

Convinced
by the
Statec

Ruling
Type

a

7-point Likert scale; 1 – ―definitely not guilty,‖ 7 – ―definitely guilty‖
Scale from 0% - 100%
c
10-point Likert scale
d
7-point Likert scale; 1 – ―definitely not guilty,‖ 4 – ―no impact,‖ 7 – ―definitely guilty‖
* Only significantly different from Not Admitted – DP
† Significantly different from the other four conditions
b

The third hypothesis was that the not admitted conditions would be significantly
different from the admitted conditions. This was tested using contrast coding in a
regression analysis. The Ruling variable was contrast coded in order to test contrasts
specified in hypotheses 3 and 4. These contrasts involved comparing all groups to the no

55

objection group, the admitted groups to the not admitted groups, the admitted groups to
each other, and the not admitted groups to each other. See Table 8 for contrast coding for
planned comparisons.
Table 8. A priori planned comparisons.
No Objection
v. all others

Admitted – no
admonition v. Admitted admonition

Not admitted –
unreliable v. Not
admitted - DP

Admitted v.
Not admitted

No Objection

4

0

0

0

Admitted – no
admonition

-1

1

0

1

Admitted admonition

-1

-1

0

1

Not admitted unreliable

-1

0

1

-1

Not admitted DP

-1

0

-1

-1

Although the model was not significant, F(4,236) = 1.212, p = .306, the contrast
between conditions in which the evidence was not admitted compared to conditions
where the evidence was admitted yielded a significant result on the verdict scale. When
the evidence was ruled admissible, participants rated the defendant higher on the verdict
scale – saw him as guiltier – than did those when the evidence was ruled inadmissible, β
= .127, p = .049. See Figure 3.
A significant regression model was found when strength of the evidence was used
as the dependent variable, F(4,236) = 2.814, p = .026. The only contrast that was
significant was the admitted/not admitted contrast, β = .208, p = .001. Those who were
told the evidence was not admitted rated the evidence as weaker than those who heard the
evidence was admitted. See Figure 4.
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There were no significant findings regarding whether participants were convinced
by the state. However, participants in the not admitted conditions responded that they
were more convinced by the defense than did participants in the admitted conditions, β =
-.186, p = .004. Although the contrast was significant, the regression model as a whole
was not, F(4,236) = 2.170, p = .073. See Figure 4.
Figure 3. Average rating of verdict comparing admitted vs. not admitted conditions.

5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0

Admitted
Not admitted

4.349
3.866

Verdict Scale*

* 7-point Likert scale; 1 – ―definitely not guilty,‖ 7 – ―definitely guilty‖

The fourth hypothesis predicted a difference between the admitted – no
admonition conditions and the admitted – admonition conditions when controlling for
type of pre-trial instruction. This hypothesis was unsupported.
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Figure 4. Average rating of strength of the evidence and whether participants were
convinced by the defense comparing admitted vs. not admitted conditions.

6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00

Admitted
5.40
4.13

4.40

5.35

Not admitted

1.00
0.00
Evidence
strength

Convinced by
defense

Hypotheses five through seven predicted an interaction between the instruction
condition and the ruling conditions based on the work on suspicion such that the ―just
verdict‖ trend would disappear when participants’ suspicion was aroused. These
hypotheses were unsupported. See Figures 5 and 6.
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Figure 5. Evidence of no interaction between type of instruction and not admitted
conditions on verdict.

Figure 6. Evidence of no interaction between type of instruction and not admitted
conditions on likelihood defendant committed the crime.
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When the analysis focused solely on the critical evidence and not the evidence as
a whole, an interaction, though non-significant, did emerge. In the no instruction
condition, the not admitted - DP group was significantly different from all other groups
in ratings of Dr. Michaels and the critical evidence, F(4,64) = 4.620, p = .002. However,
under the suspicious condition, the not admitted - DP group was only significantly
different from the admitted - admonition and not admitted - unreliable conditions.
Additionally, admitted – admonition and not admitted - unreliable were significantly
different from all other conditions except each other. See Figure 7 for a depiction of the
ratings.

Figure 7. Potential interaction between type of instruction and type of ruling on the
ratings of the forensic expert
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A post hoc analysis to look for evidence of diminished ―just verdict‖ effect on
dependent variables other than on verdict revealed a significant difference between the
not admitted - unreliable and the not admitted - DP groups on ratings of Dr. Michaels’
credibility, F(4,75) = 4.678, p = .002. Participants in the not admitted - DP condition rated
Dr. Michaels as significantly more credible when compared to the not admitted –
unreliable condition when in the no instruction condition. However, neither participants
who read a generic instruction nor the participants who read a suspicious instruction
showed this significant difference. See Figure 8.
Figure 8. Average rating of forensic expert, Dr. Michaels’, credibility by type of
instruction and not admitted conditions.
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After conducting the specified a priori hypothesis tests, all continuous dependent
variables were subjected to a two-way analysis of variance with the three levels of type of
instruction and five levels of type of ruling. See Appendix G for the results of these twoway ANOVAs, though they were not used further in the analysis..
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Factor analysis
In order to reduce the size of the data set, two principal factor analyses with
varimax rotation were performed: one on the questions regarding the impact of the
witness testimony and the witness honesty, and the second on the participants’ ratings of
the attorneys. Factors were extracted until the eigenvalues did not exceed one. A new set
of scaled variables was created using the variables whose loadings on a factor were equal
to or greater than .5. Tables 8 and 9 identify the factors and the variables found within
those factors. There is one variable that loads on two factors.
Table 9 identifies the factors regarding the impact of the witness testimony and
the witness honesty, and the second on the participants’ ratings of the attorneys. Factor 1
focuses on the impact of the witnesses’ testimony on the verdict. The second factor
focuses on the perceived honesty of the state witnesses. Factor 3 focuses on the
testimony of Dr. Michaels and how he was perceived by the participants. The final factor
focuses on the perceived honesty of the defense witnesses. These four factors account for
64% of the variance.
Table 10 identifies the factors regarding the participants’ ratings of the attorneys.
Factor 1 focuses on the perceptions of the State Attorney. Factor 2 focuses on the
perceptions of the Defense Attorney. Factor 3 focuses on the perception of manipulation
by both attorneys.
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Table 9. Results of a principal factor analysis on participants’ reaction to the evidence
and witnesses.
Factorsa
Dependent measures

1

1. Impact of the testimony of Joshua Campbell

.791

2. Impact of the testimony of Deborah Sloan

.765

3. Strength of the evidence

.753

4. Impact of the testimony of Lisa Marie Page

.720

5. Impact of the testimony of John Gardner

.719

6. Impact of the testimony of Detective Collins

.709

7. Impact of the testimony of Antonia Kirby

.689

8. Impact of the testimony of James Webster

.626

2

9. Perceived honesty of Antonia Kirby

.762

10. Perceived honesty of Detective Collins

.738

11. Perceived honesty of Joshua Campbell

.698

12. Fairness of the State’s evidence

-.589

13. Perceived honesty of James Webster

.567

3

14. Dr. Michaels’ confidence

.792

15. Dr. Michaels’ credibility

.761

16. Impact of Dr. Michaels’ testimony

.715

17. Impact of the hair evidence

.517

4

.669

18. Perceived honesty of Lisa Marie Page

.853

19. Perceived honesty of Deborah Sloan

.781

20. Perceived honesty of John Gardner

.603

a

Factor labels: 1, Impact of the evidence on the verdict (All Other Evidence Factor); 2,
Perceived honesty of the State’s witnesses; 3, Perceptions of Dr. Michaels and his
evidence (Forensic Expert Factor); 4, Perceived honesty of the Defense witnesses.
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Table 10. Results of a principal factor analysis on participants’ reaction to the attorneys.
Factorsa
Dependent measures

1

1. Competence of the State Attorney

.835

2. Trustworthiness of the State Attorney

.819

3. Convinced by the State Attorney

.707

2

4. Competence of the Defense Attorney

.888

5. Trustworthiness of the Defense Attorney

.863

6. Convinced by the Defense Attorney

.500

3

7. Defense manipulative

.805

8. State manipulative

.716

a

Factor labels: 1, Perception of the State Attorney (State Attorney Factor); 2, Perception
of the Defense Attorney; 3, Perception of manipulation by the attorneys

Recoding of the independent variables
The independent variables were dummy coded in order to compute a regression
analysis. The Instruction variable was recoded such that the no instruction condition was
the baseline. The Ruling variable was recoded such that the not admitted – unreliable
condition was the baseline. The reason for choosing the not admitted – unreliable
condition as the baseline is that theoretically this group should be the most different from
the others. If the ―just verdict‖ hypothesis is correct, participants in this group should see
the evidence as less influential when compared to all other groups. See Tables 11 and 12.
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Table 11. Dummy coding of the instruction variable using no instruction as the reference
group.
D1

D2

No instruction

0

0

Generic instruction

1

0

Suspicious instruction

0

1

Table 12. Dummy coding of the ruling variable using not admitted - unreliable as the
reference group.
D1

D2

D3

D4

Not admitted - unreliable

0

0

0

0

No objection

1

0

0

0

Admitted – no admonition

0

1

0

0

Admitted - admonition

0

0

1

0

Not admitted - DP

0

0

0

1

Regression analysis using the created factor variables as the dependent variables
The factor variables were used as the dependent variables in a regression analysis.
The contrast-coded independent variables were used as the predictors. The contrastcoded predictors yielded only one significant model on the Forensic Expert Factor, F4,205
= 5.323, p =.000, adj r2 = .076. Only one contrast was significant – the comparison
between participants in the not admitted – unreliable condition versus the participants in
the not admitted - DP condition. Those in the not admitted – unreliable condition had a
lower score on the combined Dr. Michaels factor variable showing that overall they
found him less convincing than did those in the not admitted - DP condition.
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The factor variables were then used as the dependent variables in a regression
analysis with the instruction dummy-coded variables as the predictors using the no
instruction group as the baseline. The dummy-coded instruction predictors yielded two
significant models on the evidence impact factor, F2,207 = 3.007, p =.05, adj r2 = .019, and
on the State Attorney Factor, F2,225 = 4.227, p =.016, adj r2 = .028. In both cases, the
participants in the suspicious group were significantly different from the no instruction
group. Those in the suspicious instruction group had a lower score on the combined All
Other Evidence Impact Factor variable than did those in the no instruction group
suggesting that those who had read a suspicious instruction regarded the evidence as
weaker than the group who had not read an instruction. The suspicious group also had a
lower score on the combined State Attorney Factor which suggests the suspicious
instruction affected how participants viewed the State’s Attorney, but not how they
viewed the Defense Attorney.
Path Analysis
Based on the results of these regressions, a path analysis was constructed using
the variable ―likelihood the defendant committed the crime‖ as the outcome variable (see
Figure 9). The reason this variable was selected instead of the ―guilt scale‖ is due to the
high correlation between the two variables. The correlation between ―likelihood‖ and
―guilt scale‖ resulted in r = .814, so these variables are essentially measuring the same
thing. The greater the perceived likelihood that the defendant committed the crime, the
higher the rating on the verdict scale, with higher ratings meaning greater likelihood of
guilt.
The five mediating variables were selected based on significant results from
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multiple regression analyses. Because the only contrast that was significant was the not
admitted - unreliable versus the not admitted – DP, the path analysis uses the dummy
coded IVs for Ruling with not admitted – unreliable as the reference group and the
dummy coded IVs for Instruction with no instruction as the reference group.
Entering all the variables into a regression model with the IVs on Step 1 and the
mediators on Step 2 resulted in a significant overall model, F(12,187) = 34.848, p=.000,
adjusted r2 = .689. Overall the model accounts for 69% of the variance. See Table 10 for
standardized total, direct, and indirect effects.
The suspicious instruction had a significant total effect; however, it did not have a
significant direct effect. The influence of the suspicious instruction on the likelihood the
defendant committed the crime was mediated through the State Attorney Factor, the All
Other Evidence Impact factor, and the difference in the manipulation ratings of the two
attorneys. See Table 13.
Total effects. The only IV to have a total effect was the suspicious instruction
when compared to those who had not heard an instruction. The total effect was negative.
Compared to the no instruction group, those in the suspicious condition rated the
defendant as less likely to have committed the crime.
Direct effects – IVs to mediators. The suspicious instruction had a significant
direct effect on the State Attorney Factor, the All Other Evidence Impact Factor, and the
manipulation difference score when compared to no instruction. The direction of the
effect was negative for both the State Attorney Factor and the All Other Evidence Impact
Factor. Compared to the no instruction condition, participants in the suspicious
instruction condition saw the State Attorney as less trustworthy, competent, and
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convincing; they also saw the evidence as a whole as having less of a guilty impact. The
direction of the effect for the manipulation difference was positive suggesting that
participants in the suspicious condition rated the State Attorney as more manipulative
than the defense when compared to the no instruction condition.
The conditions admitted – no admonition and admitted - admonition were both
significantly different from the not admitted - unreliable condition on the State Attorney
Factor. The direction of the effect for both was positive suggesting that participants in
these two conditions saw the State Attorney as more trustworthy, competent, and
convincing when compared to those in the not admitted - unreliable condition.
The participants in the admissible – no admonition and not admitted - DP
conditions saw the forensic expert, Dr. Michaels, as more credible, confident, and having
a greater impact on guilt compared to the not admitted - unreliable condition.
All four ruling conditions were significant when compared to the not admitted unreliable condition on the mediator called ―mention of hair against defendant.‖ This is
a variable created from an open-ended question. Participants were asked which two
pieces of evidence they saw as being the strongest against the defendant. This question
was recoded for mentions of the critical hair evidence. The results suggest that
participants in all conditions mentioned the hair evidence at a greater rate when compared
to the not admitted - unreliable condition.
Direct effects – mediators to DV. The State Attorney Factor was a significant
predictor of the likelihood the defendant committed the crime. The direction of the effect
was positive suggesting that those who saw the State Attorney as more trustworthy,
competent, and convincing were also more likely to think the defendant had committed
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the crime.
The All Other Evidence Impact Factor was also a significant predictor of
likelihood rating. Again, the direction of the effect is positive. The greater the impact of
the evidence on a guilty verdict, the greater the likelihood the defendant committed the
crime.
Finally, the Forensic Expert Factor had a direct effect on likelihood rating also in
a positive direction. The higher the rating of the forensic expert, Dr. Michaels’,
credibility, confidence, and impact on guilt, the greater the likelihood the defendant
committed the crime.
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Figure 9. Path analysis predicting likelihood defendant committed the crime – only
significant paths are depicted.
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Table 13. Standardized total, direct, and indirect effects for dummy coded IVs and
mediators on dependent variable ―Likelihood defendant committed the crime.‖
Total

Direct

Indirect

Effect

Effect

Effect

Not admitted – DP/ Not admitted - unreliable

-.005

-.045

.040

Admitted – admonition/ Not admitted - unreliable

.105

-.002

.107

.109

-.003

.112

.061

.024

.037

Suspicious/No Instruction

-.250*

-.060

-.190

Generic/No Instruction

-.130

-.075

-.055

Mention of hair evidence against Defendant

---

-.007

---

Manipulation Rating Difference

---

.033

---

Forensic Expert, Dr. Michaels, Factor

---

.297*

---

All Other Evidence Impact Factor

---

.639*

---

State Attorney Factor

---

.174*

---

Incorrect answer to manipulation check

---

.062

Competence Rating Differencea

---

.021

Admitted – no admonition/ Not admitted unreliable
No Objection/Not admitted - unreliable

* Significant at the .05 level
a – included in the model based on significance in a smaller model

---
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Table 14. Standardized direct effects of dummy coded IVs on mediator variables.
Mediator Variables
Mention
of hair
against D

Competence
Rating
Difference

Manip
Rating
Difference

Forensic
Expert
Factor

All
Other
Evid
Factor

State
Atty
Factor

Incorrect
answer to
manip
check

Not admitted
– DP/ Not
admitted unreliable

.184*

-.012

.005

.377*

-.068

.057

-.067

Admitted –
admonition/
Not admitted unreliable

.250*

.020

-.093

.138

.108

.201*

.038

Admitted – no
admonition/
Not admitted unreliable

.217*

.039

-.112

.208*

.074

.181*

.090

No
Objection/Not
admitted unreliable

.217*

.043

-.042

.124

.051

.041

-.136

Suspicious/
No Instruction

.116

-.128

.179*

-.001

-.191*

-.193*

-.369*

Generic/No
Instruction

.009

.068

.013

-.018

-.061

.002

-.336*

Dummy
coded IVs

* Significant at the .05 level

72

Chapter 4. Discussion
Summary of results
The current study was designed to examine whether pre-trial instructions,
including a suspicion-arousing instruction, could reduce the impact of all inadmissible
evidence and not just that which was ruled unreliable. The study drew from work on
instructions warning individuals about the potential of ―to-be-ignored‖ information, work
on the effect of arousing suspicion on juror decision-making, and the ―just verdict‖
hypothesis of Kassin and Sommers (1997). The current study partially supported both
the suspicion research and the just verdict research; however, the two lines of research
did not interact in the predicted way.
Timing of instructions. Participants who are instructed, or warned, ahead of
time that they may not be required to use all of the subsequent information are better able
to ignore information when told to. The effect is strengthened when participants are
instructed twice – before hearing the information and after. In the current study, these
findings were used to hypothesize that a pre-trial instruction referring to the possibility of
inadmissible evidence, followed by an in-trial admonition, and a judicial closing
instruction, could diminish the ―just verdict‖ effect. In essence, when warned ahead of
time and reminded later, participants would disregard inadmissible evidence regardless of
the reason for inadmissibility – unreliable or due process. This hypothesis was not
supported as predicted.
In order for this hypothesis to be supported, the independent variables would have
needed to show a significant interaction. When participants did not read a pre-trial
instruction, the classic ―just verdict‖ effect would have emerged with participants
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choosing to disregard evidence that was not admitted because it was unreliable, but not
evidence that was not admitted for legal reasons. This hypothesis would have been
supported if the participants who read evidence that was not admitted for legal reasons
had significantly more guilty ratings when compared to participants who read evidence
that was not admitted because it was unreliable. When participants read a generic
instruction and participants read a suspicion-arousing instruction, differences on guilt
rating between the participants who read evidence that was not admitted because it was
unreliable and the participants who read evidence that was not admitted for legal reasons
should have been reduced. This did not happen. One possible reason for this is because
the trial summary produced overwhelmingly ―not guilty‖ verdicts across all conditions.
Content of instructions – raising suspicion. Fein and his colleagues have
suggested that arousing suspicion is a way to encourage participants to examine evidence
more carefully and to question the motives behind the evidence. In the current study, the
literature on suspicion would predict that participants who read a suspicious pre-trial
instruction would find everyone – attorneys and witnesses – as less honest and find the
evidence less convincing when compared to other conditions. It was also hypothesized
that those who read a suspicious pre-trial instruction would find it less likely that the
defendant had committed the crime and vote not guilty more often. Although there were
no significant differences between instruction conditions on verdict, the pre-trial
instruction designed to arouse suspicion was a significant predictor of the likelihood that
the defendant committed the crime but only when mediated through ratings of the
evidence as a whole and ratings of the State Attorney in particular.
As predicted, participants who read a pre-trial instruction designed to arouse
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suspicion viewed the evidence as less convincing of guilt. Combining the variables into
factors, participants who read a pre-trial instruction designed to arouse suspicion had the
lowest scores on the Evidence Impact Factor when compared to the participants who did
not read a pre-trial instruction suggesting that those participants who read the suspicious
pre-trial instruction viewed the evidence as supportive of not guilty rather than guilty. As
Fein and his colleagues suggested, arousing suspicion may have encouraged participants
to reserve judgment and not take the evidence at face value, thus holding the evidence to
a higher standard than those who did not read a pre-trial instruction. The suspicious pretrial instruction may also mimic the Kassin and Wrightsman (1979) instruction condition
where they hypothesized that participants who read an instruction presumed the
defendant was innocent while those who did not read an instruction presumed he was
guilty. However, Kassin and Wrightsman (1979) found that participants thought it less
likely that the defendant had committed the crime when given a general instruction. The
current study found similar results, except only when the participants read a suspicious
pre-trial instruction and compared to participants who did not read a pre-trial instruction.
It seems the generic pre-trial instruction did not have an effect.
Additionally, participants who read a pre-trial instruction designed to arouse
suspicion viewed the State Attorney as less trustworthy, competent, and convincing when
compared to those who did not read a pre-trial instruction. This is contrary to the first
hypothesis, which predicted that those who read a suspicious pre-trial instruction would
view everyone as less honest and trustworthy. There was no effect on the honesty ratings
of the witnesses or on the ratings of the defense attorney. Furthermore, participants who
read a pre-trial instruction designed to arouse suspicion viewed the State Attorney as
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more manipulative than the defense attorney when compared to participants who did not
read a pre-trial instruction.
Based on these results, the question to be asked is, why did the suspicious pre-trial
instruction only influence ratings of the State Attorney and not the defense attorney? One
possible reason is that the suspicious pre-trial instruction referred specifically to the
introduction of evidence. Participants may have seen this as pointing only to the State
Attorney, as he is the only attorney who called a witness that introduced physical
evidence. Although the defense attorney called three witnesses who provided verbal
testimony, they did not provide any physical evidence. The finding may have been a
function of the wording of the suspicious pre-trial instruction and may not replicate.
Another possibility is that participants hold the evidence to a higher standard once
suspicion is aroused (Fein, et al., 1997). Since the burden of proof lies with the state, the
suspicious pre-trial instruction aroused suspicion toward the attorney who had to prove
his case. Participants held the State Attorney to a higher standard.
A third possibility is that people, in general, are suspicious of the defense
attorney. When the judge warned against attorneys possibly introducing evidence to
manipulate the jury’s way of thinking, participants may have assumed this was referring
to the State Attorney since everyone already knows to be wary of defense attorneys.
Another question to be answered is, why didn’t the suspicious pre-trial instruction
have an effect on the rating of the forensic expert and his testimony? Participants who
read the pre-trial instruction designed to arouse suspicion rated all the other evidence as
less convincing when compared to those who had not read a pre-trial instruction, yet
there was no difference in the ratings of the forensic expert and his critical testimony.
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Just verdict. The just verdict hypothesis predicts that jurors will choose to
disregard inadmissible evidence if it is unreliable, but not if it is inadmissible for legal
reasons (Kassin & Sommers, 1996). Based on this research, the current study predicted a
main effect for ruling condition such that participants who read evidence that was not
admitted because it was unreliable should have the fewest guilty verdicts and find the
critical evidence less convincing. Although there were no differences on the verdict
scales and no differences on the ratings of the likelihood the defendant committed the
crime, there were differences in the ratings of Dr. Michaels who provided the critical
testimony. The path analysis shows that when compared to the participants who read
evidence that was not admitted because it was unreliable, those who read evidence that
was admitted without a further admonition from the judge and participants who read
evidence that was not admitted for legal reasons rated Dr. Michaels as more convincing,
credible, and confident. This is consistent with the just verdict hypothesis which would
predict that participants who read evidence that was not admitted for legal reasons would
act as though the evidence was admissible.
Interestingly, when the evidence was admissible but the judge offered a further
admonition to weigh the evidence, there was no difference on ratings of Dr. Michaels
when compared to participants who read evidence that was not admitted because it was
unreliable. Participants seemed to have taken that further admonition as an indication of
unreliability and rated Dr. Michaels accordingly. The only questionable result is that
participants who did not read any objection to the critical evidence did not have higher
ratings of Dr. Michaels when compared to the participants who read evidence that was
not admitted because it was unreliable.
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Following the just verdict hypothesis, when the evidence was not admitted for
being unreliable, fewer participants than expected mentioned the hair evidence when
compared to all other conditions. The other conditions all mentioned the evidence at the
same rate. As predicted, it seemed as though participants who read evidence that was not
admitted because it was unreliable were better able to disregard the evidence.
A post hoc analysis was conducted comparing the admitted conditions to each
other for mentions of the hair evidence in the specific instruction conditions. When
participants did not read a pre-trial instruction or when participants read a generic pretrial instruction, the chi-square was not significant (χ2 = 3.319, p = .506, V = .204, χ2 =
10.926, p = .206, V = .367, respectively). No matter whether the evidence was admitted
or not admitted, participants mentioned the hair evidence at the expected rate.
However, when participants read the suspicious pre-trial instruction, both those
who did not read an objection to the critical evidence and those who read evidence that
was admitted without a further admonition from the judge mentioned the hair much more
than would be expected. While participants who read evidence that was not admitted
because it was unreliable mentioned the hair much less than would be expected (χ2 =
17.847, p = .001, V = .472).

The suspicious pre-trial instruction appeared to exacerbate

the just verdict effect such that it made the unreliable evidence seem even more
unreliable and participants rarely mentioned the hair evidence which is support that they
were disregarding it; it did not affect the participants who read evidence that was not
admitted for legal reasons. See Table 15.
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Table 15. Effect of the suspicious instruction on open-ended responses regarding critical
evidence against the defendant.
Hair evidence
No mention of hair
evidence

Mention of hair
evidence

Observed

2

14

Expected

6.6

9.4

Observed

4

12

Expected

6.6

9.4

Observed

7

9

Expected

6.6

9.4

Not admitted –
unreliable

Observed

13

3

Expected

6.6

9.4

Not admitted – due
process

Observed

7

9

Expected

6.6

9.4

No objection
Admitted – no
admonition

Admitted - admonition

Although there was some support of the ―just verdict‖ hypothesis, the just verdict
effect was not found in ratings of guilt or likelihood that the defendant committed the
crime. One possible reason for this is the weakness of the manipulation – both the
unreliable manipulation and the due process manipulation. In the condition in which the
evidence was not admitted because it was unreliable, the judge should have stated his
reason for sustaining the objection as unreliable. In addition, the 12% error rate
mentioned in the critical testimony is not an extreme error rate and might not have been
perceived as unreliable by participants. Additionally, the due process manipulation was
weak, as the evidence was not admitted based on a pre-trial motion. This manipulation
could have been made stronger if the evidence was unconstitutionally or illegally seized.
Because the current study is not an exact replication of Kassin and Sommers
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(1997), it is difficult to determine how the effects found here match what was found in
the original study. Kassin and Sommers (1997) and the studies discussed in Steblay
(2006) compared the condition in which the evidence was not admitted because it was
unreliable to a control group that did not hear the critical evidence. The current study did
not have a control group – all conditions read the critical evidence – and as such, the
findings cannot be matched to those in previous studies. Nevertheless, the results in the
current study do lend further support to the just verdict hypothesis in that participants
who read evidence that was not admitted because it was unreliable did disregard that
evidence, even more so when suspicion was aroused.
Non-hypothesized findings. Without a pre-trial instruction, those in all three
conditions in which the evidence was admitted were no different from the participants
who read evidence that was not admitted because it was unreliable on ratings of Dr.
Michaels’ testimony - all four conditions treated Dr. Michaels’ testimony statistically the
same. However, when given a suspicious pre-trial instruction, the ratings of the
participants who had not read an objection and participants who read that the evidence
was admitted without a further admonition were no different from the ratings of
participants who had read the evidence was not admitted for legal reasons. Those
participant ratings of the testimony were all significantly different from the ratings of the
participants who had read that the evidence was admitted with a further admonition and
those who had read the evidence was not admitted because it was unreliable. The ratings
of the participants who had read that the evidence was admitted with a further admonition
and those who had read the evidence was not admitted because it was unreliable were not
statistically different.
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Why would a suspicious pre-trial instruction make participants who had not read
an objection and participants who read that the evidence was admitted without a further
admonition see Dr. Michaels’ testimony as more credible and him as more confident
when compared to participants who had read that the evidence was not admitted because
it was unreliable? However, this result was not the case for those participants who had
not read a pre-trial instruction. The objective of the suspicious pre-trial instruction was to
make participants think more about the reasons why an attorney may enter evidence into
a trial and to question motives, not to take evidence at face value. The objective of the
judge’s admonition was to allow participants to use the information, but warn them
against taking it at face value.
Perhaps the suspicious pre-trial instruction put the focus on the State Attorney and
away from Dr. Michaels. The findings support this theory – those who had read a
suspicious pre-trial instruction rated the State Attorney as less convincing and competent
when compared to those who had not read a pre-trial instruction, whereas the suspicious
pre-trial instruction had no effect on the ratings of Dr. Michaels and his testimony. When
it came to evaluating Dr. Michaels’ testimony, the suspicious pre-trial instruction had the
unintended effect of making participants think less critically about Dr. Michaels’
testimony and more critically about the attorney introducing it. When Dr. Michaels’
testimony was not objected to or it was admitted with no admonition, participants decided
that the State Attorney must not be introducing this evidence to manipulate the jury’s
thinking, thus making Dr. Michaels seem more credible and confident. This finding is
contrary to what the suspicion literature would predict – if Dr. Michaels was viewed as
unreliable without a pre-trial instruction, the suspicion literature would predict he should
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have continued to be viewed that way with a suspicious pre-trial instruction. The
suspicious pre-trial instruction was meant to increase critical thinking and decrease taking
the evidence at face value. With no objection or a further admonition, participants in this
study who read the suspicious pre-trial instruction took Dr. Michaels’ testimony at face
value with no further evaluation because they were so focused on the State Attorney.
Meanwhile, the in-trial admonition following Dr. Michaels’ testimony made him
seem unreliable to participants, with or without a pre-trial instruction. The in-trial
admonition served to draw attention to Dr. Michaels, which increased the critical
evaluation of his testimony and made him appear less reliable to participants. The in-trial
admonition became another way of raising suspicion. With a larger sample size, it is
possible this interaction would have been significant and it is worth further exploration
especially since it points to the power of judicial instructions in altering the way a juror
views the evidence and the attorney introducing that evidence.
Another interesting finding from the path analysis is that when compared to the
participants who read evidence that was not admitted because it was unreliable, the two
conditions in which the judge ruled the evidence as admissible rated the State Attorney as
more competent, trustworthy, and convincing. Participants may have viewed the judge’s
ruling as evidence that the attorney is competent; if the judge rules that the evidence can
come in, then the attorney must know what he is doing. It is interesting that a judge’s
ruling can have an effect on the way an attorney is viewed.
A final finding from the path analysis is a reassuring one for the jury system.
Although the direct effect from the ratings of the State Attorney to the likelihood the
defendant committed the crime was significant, it was a small effect. The largest direct
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effect was from the All Other Evidence Impact Factor. It is encouraging to see that
strength of the evidence is the strongest predictor of the likelihood that the defendant
committed the crime and not how the participants viewed the State Attorney.
Unique aspects of this study
Mock jury studies rely on college students as participants. This study used people
who had been called for jury service, but were not needed for a trial. Only 6% of the
sample had actually been questioned for a jury on the day of the study, the other 94%
were people who had been called in for jury service, but the case for which they were
called either did not need as many jurors as expected or did not go forward on that
particular day. Thus, the majority of the sample was not participants who had been
excluded from a jury making them different from other jurors in some way; they were
just simply not needed. Peterson (2001) examined several meta-analyses in which effect
sizes were reported for both college students and non-students. Peterson (2001) found
that college students had less variability in responses. In 19% of the relationships
examined, the effect size for the college student sample was in a direction opposite that of
the non-student sample (Peterson, 2001). In addition, in 29% of relationships, the
strength of the relationship differed between the students and the non-students although
the direction of the effect was the same. The conclusion that Peterson (2001) drew was
that college students are not always capable of producing generalizable results and that
studies should be re-tested on non-students before being generalized.
Oakes (1972) looked at the effect of reinforcement on self-esteem. Conducting
the study on college students made to participate for course credit, Oakes found that
reinforcement made the college students participate in group discussion and take on a
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leadership role, which led to higher self-esteem (1972). However, when Oakes (1972)
used volunteers from the general population, he found that reinforcement had no effect on
the participants. Although Oakes found differences between the results of college
students when compared to the general population, he did not see this as a reason to
doubt the external validity of studies using college students because ―a behavioural
phenomenon reliably exhibited is a genuine phenomenon‖ (p. 962).
By testing conditions not previously relied upon in the literature – a pre-trial
instruction designed to arouse suspicion, an in-trial admonition in which the judge
allowed the participants to attend to the evidence, and a warning to give it the appropriate
weight when reaching a decision, the current study allowed for some exploratory
analyses. This study showed that an instruction designed to raise suspicion provided by
the judge at the beginning of a trial has an impact on how the evidence is viewed
throughout the rest of the trial. In some instances, the ―just verdict‖ effect was
exacerbated by this suspicious pre-trial instruction, indicating that perhaps the reason
jurors choose to disregard evidence that is considered unreliable is because they are
suspicious of it and this suspicion may be one underlying factor of the ―just verdict‖
effect.
Limitations
One of the main limitations of the study is that the conditions in which no reason
was given for the objection were ultimately seen by the participants as being unreliable.
The manipulation check verified this assumption. Participants correctly answered that
evidence had been objected to, but when asked about the reason behind the objection,
participants in the conditions where no reason was given for the objection selected ―the
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evidence was unreliable‖ more than 50% of the time. This is a failure of the
manipulation. Rather than having a clear cut unreliable objection and a clear cut due
process objection, the study ended up with multiple conditions in which the participant
viewed the evidence as unreliable and only one due process condition.
In accord with the just verdict hypothesis, participants will disregard unreliable
evidence, but not evidence that is disallowed for a legal reason. Although the evidence in
these conditions was allowed, if the participant thought the evidence was unreliable and
assumed reliability was the reason for the objection, she may have disregarded it anyway,
which could account for the overwhelming not guilty verdicts. However, this finding
suggests that attorneys should provide a reason for an objection because if they do not,
the juror will read between the lines and assume the reason for the objection.
Another limitation of the current study is the use of a trial summary rather than a
full trial transcript. With a short trial summary, it is difficult to generalize to jurors who
sit on an actual jury that may last hours, days, or weeks.
Having participants watch a mock trial would have made the experience more
realistic and given the study more external validity. Most people rely on visual cues, as
well as verbal, to judge honesty and trustworthiness. With only a written trial summary
from which to judge character, participants may have found answering those questions
relating to honesty hard to answer.
A final limitation was the lack of diversity in the verdict ratings. Although the
evidence in the trial was meant to be weak without the critical evidence, even in the
conditions in which the critical evidence was allowed, the verdicts were overwhelming
not guilty when asked on a dichotomous scale and neutral when asked on a Likert scale.
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Future research
A future direction for this research is to determine whether the pre-trial instruction
designed to arouse suspicion made participants more critical in their evaluation of the
evidence or just made them more cynical of the evidence and testimony. The results
might suggest that there was critical thinking at work since those who read the suspicious
instruction found all the other evidence except the critical evidence unconvincing. If the
instruction made the participants generally more cynical they should have rated all
evidence as unconvincing and they should have had lower ratings of both the State
Attorney and the Defense Attorney, not just the State Attorney. However, based on the
dependent variables in the current study, it cannot be affirmed whether the results are a
consequence of critical thinking or a general attitude of cynicism.
Jury deliberations. Jury deliberations may soften the blow of inadmissible
evidence. Most jury simulation studies involve a group of participants in the same room,
but the reported conviction rates are based on individual responses without deliberation.
Kerwin and Shaffer (1994) sought to examine the role of deliberations in decisionmaking regarding inadmissible evidence. Three hundred twelve introductory psychology
students participated as either individual, non-deliberating jurors or as members of
deliberating juries all of which read a trial summary with illegal search evidence. These
two groups were further split into two more groups in which the illegal search evidence
was either admissible or inadmissible. The results indicated that juries instructed to
ignore incriminating evidence were more inclined to acquit than individual jurors who
had received the same instructions even though prior to deliberations, members of juries
had expressed similar attitudes when compared to the individual jurors (Kerwin &
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Shaffer, 1994). Kerwin and Shaffer also measured beliefs concerning the defendant’s
guilt. Although the members of the mock jury personally believed the defendant to be
guilty, they still made the group decision to acquit when the incriminating evidence was
ruled inadmissible.
London and Nunez (2000) sought to refute Kassin and Sommers’ (1997) ―just
verdict‖ hypothesis by presenting mock juries with critical evidence that was deemed
admissible or inadmissible with a due process rationale. A control group read the same
written trial summary without the critical evidence. Prior to deliberations the individual
jurors were prejudiced by the evidence such that jurors in the inadmissible condition
voted guilty more often than those in the control condition (London & Nunez). This
prejudice was reduced after deliberations with jurors in the inadmissible condition more
apt to change their pre-deliberation verdict. The results tend to contradict the findings of
Kassin and Sommers (1997) where individual jurors disregarded unreliable critical
evidence, but would not disregard critical evidence that violated due process. However,
this study did not include inadmissible evidence dismissed for reasons of reliability. The
findings of London and Nunez (2000) further support the idea that juries, as opposed to
individual jurors, are able to comply with limiting instructions.
Both Kerwin and Shaffer (1994) and London and Nunez (2000) discuss why
juries as a group are more apt to ignore critical evidence than are individual jurors. The
first reason postulated is accountability: when confronted with members of a jury, an
individual must account for his opinions and beliefs (Kerwin and Shaffer). Kerwin and
Shaffer suggest individuals may have a difficult time justifying verdicts based on
inadmissible evidence to other group members.
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Another reason proposed for the reduced impact of inadmissible evidence
amongst juries is that jury deliberations may allow for proper interpretation of the
evidence (London & Nunez). A third reason is that jury deliberations create alternative
stories for the case at hand (London & Nunez). These viewpoints allow other members
to view the situation in a way they may not have considered. Jury deliberations allow for
an open forum where ideas and opinions can be discussed and justified.
Conclusions
To answer the question put forth at the beginning of this study, varying the timing
and content of the instructions did influence the decision-making process, though not in
the predicted way. While the instruction conditions did not interact with the ruling
conditions to diminish the ―just verdict‖ effect, the suspicious instruction condition
provided interesting results. The suspicious pre-trial instruction not only focused the
juror’s attention on the evidence, as predicted, but also highlighted the role of the State
Attorney, which was not predicted. The suspicious instruction was the only independent
variable that had a significant total effect on one of the outcome variables – likelihood the
defendant committed the crime. Participants who read the suspicious pre-trial instruction
were less convinced by the evidence and by the State Attorney. In turn, the lower the
ratings of the evidence and of the State Attorney led participants to conclude that it was
less likely that the defendant committed the crime. This is evidence of the potential
power of judicial instructions to counteract jurors’ psychological tendencies. There is
still room for further exploration to determine why the suspicious pre-trial instruction had
such an impact on ratings of the State Attorney and not the defense attorney.

88

Appendix A. Pilot
Participants were solicited by the Principal Investigator from dismissed jurors in
the Jury Assembly Room and asked to listen to a recorded trial summary, which lasted on
average 15 minutes, and to answer some questions regarding what they had just heard.
For the pilot test, the trial summary was presented in an audio version. Since
there were 15 conditions, the audio could not be played aloud as one large group would
fill up almost an entire cell, minimizing random selection. In order to maintain the audio
aspect, but still allow for individual randomization, 20 1GB MP3 players were purchased,
along with 250 sets of ear bud headphones. Participants were allowed to keep the
headphones after participation for sanitary reasons.
The trial summary was made up of numbered paragraphs with each paragraph
being a separate audio clip. This enabled multiple clips to be strung together in order to
create one fluid condition. It also allowed certain clips to be added or deleted depending
on what the condition called for. Three male voices were used representing the State
Attorney, the Defense Attorney, and the judge. The sound quality was not ideal with
some voices louder than others, though this was the same across all conditions since the
same clips were used for all.
The stimulus material was a modified version of a trial summary used by Kassin:
State of Arizona v. John Gardner. In the trial summary, the defendant is accused of
murdering a young woman after being seen with her at a party. All conditions included
opening statements, descriptions of witness testimony, closing statements, and judicial
closing instructions. Some conditions also received a judicial opening instruction prior to
the summary.
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For the pilot, the manipulated piece of evidence was the testimony of another
party-attendant, James Webster. James Webster testified to seeing the defendant fighting
with the woman and then both of them getting into the car together and leaving. In the
reliability conditions, Webster’s testimony was objected to because of his high level of
intoxication at the party. In the due process conditions, Webster’s testimony was
objected to because of a prior motion that he was not allowed to mention the defendant
and the woman getting in the car together. When introduced in the trial summary, the
participants read the lawyers objection and were provided with the reason for the
objection – no reason given, reliability, or due process – and the judge’s ruling.
Participants were randomly assigned an MP3 player pre-loaded with 1 of 15
conditions. In theory this was an innovative idea; in practice, it was cumbersome. It was
difficult to coordinate a number of people with the MP3 players – some people had
trouble getting it started, others could not hear – and having to stop and help individual
users took time and was a distraction for other participants. Additionally, outside noise
from the court made it difficult for people to attend fully to what they were listening to.
Using the audio version limited the numbers of participants at any given time as only 20
MP3 players were available due to cost constraints as they were purchased out-of-pocket.
At least one of every condition was included in the pilot; out of the original 20
participants, only one person voted guilty. The lack of variation led to several changes in
both the trial summary and the questionnaire. The research format was changed from an
audio trial summary to a written version to facilitate ease of making changes and also to
allow more participants to take part in the study. Some major changes were made to the
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content of the trial summary. The questionnaire was also altered to correspond to the
new trial summary, but also to refine the questions being asked.
Changes to the trial summary:
1) Using the comments from the pilot participants, the trial summary was changed to
a written version. One participant, who is a lawyer, mentioned afterward that he
wished he had taken notes. He thought just 15 minutes he would remember, but
he said he found the quick back-and-forth confusing.
2) Participants’ open-ended responses suggested two compelling pieces of evidence:
1) the fact that the defendant’s hair was found on the victim’s body; 2) the
testimony of Mrs. Kirby who said she saw the defendant’s car parked on her street
near where the victim was found. Participants did not find the testimony of James
Webster to have the impact that it was meant to have. This led to three major
changes in the testimony of these witnesses.
a) Originally, Mrs. Kirby testified that she saw the defendant’s car at night from
the window, could not really tell the color with the street lamps, and that she
had had a few glasses of wine. People wrote that they did not believe her
because she had been drinking.
In the revised version, there was no mention of alcohol and her testimony
was changed so that she was out walking her dog when she saw a car
matching the defendant’s with a Texas license plate. She also testified that
she saw someone sleeping in the back seat of the car. Interestingly, people
STILL did not fully trust Mrs. Kirby’s testimony as she could not identify the
defendant and she did not write down the license plate number. It was 11:30
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at night and he was sleeping in the backseat, but participants still wanted her
to have identified him.
Her testimony could be made stronger if she said she saw the man in the
car was wearing a white sweatshirt and someone else confirms that the
defendant had been wearing a white sweatshirt that night.
b) The key piece of evidence in the pilot was the testimony of Mr. James
Webster who testified to seeing the defendant and the victim arguing and then
getting in the defendant’s car. This was objected to, though honestly, it never
really felt like a strong enough piece of evidence to be objected to and to
really have an impact.
In the revision, Mr. Webster still testified to this argument, but his level of
intoxication was reduced and his testimony was no longer objected to.
c) In the version pilot-tested, an expert witness testified that he matched a hair on
the victim’s body to the defendant. On cross-examination, he testified that
there was another hair found that did not belong to the victim or the
defendant. This produced considerable reasonable doubt.
For the revised version, ―other‖ hair on the body is omitted and the
defendant’s hair is found under the victim’s fingernail instead of merely ―on
her body.‖ In the ―reliability‖ condition, this evidence is called into question
on cross-examination by referencing a study by a major scientific organization
that calls hair matching unreliable. The doctor admits there is a possibility the
hair could belong to someone else and also that there is a 12% error rate in
this type of hair identification. He mentions this error rate in all conditions,
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except the ―due process‖ condition. In the ―due process‖ condition, the doctor
testifies the defendant’s hair was found under the victim’s fingernail and the
defense objects that this was not supposed to come in due to a motion granted
before the trial. There is no further cross-examination in this condition.
3) The revised trial summary was amended such that words that could be seen as
telling the participants what to think were removed to allow participants make
their own decision regarding the evidence. For example, phrases such as ―the
State has no concrete evidence,‖―as you might expect…Gardner now denies the
charge,‖ and ―the State has no credible evidence to prove its allegations‖ were
removed.
4) After realizing that participants were pulling phrases directly from the defense
closing to answer some of the open-ended questions, I changed the defense
closing to be less dramatic. Three items were removed: 1) the phrase
―circumstantial evidence;‖ 2) the mention of Mrs. Kirby’s failure to write down
the license plate; and 3) a reference to the fact that the store clerk testified that
John hugged Carrie, leading to a possibility that that is where the hair came from.
5) Deborah Sloan testified that she did not know whether John had showered before
she saw him the next morning. In the revised version, John admits on crossexamination that he did indeed take a shower that morning.
6) During the pilot, while answering the questionnaire, participants often asked ―who
is so-and-so again?‖ It was clear that in a 15-minute audio trial summary it was
difficult to remember the names and testimony of the various witnesses.
For the full study, descriptors for each witness were now included to make
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them more memorable. Some examples are: ―Avondale resident Antonia Kirby‖;
―partygoer James Webster‖, ―store clerk Joshua Campbell‖, and ―the defendant’s
girlfriend Lisa Marie Page‖. These descriptors are used in the trial summary
whenever the witness is mentioned. They are also used in the questionnaire
whenever the witness is mentioned. Open-ended answers show that the
descriptors helped as participants included the descriptors in their answers. For
example, participants wrote answers referring to ―partygoer James Webster’s
testimony.‖
7) Added a front-page message to the participants that stated: The purpose of this
research is to understand the process of juror decision-making. Please imagine
that you are a juror in this criminal case as you carefully read the trial summary.
Changes to the questionnaire (See Appendices D and E for both the original and the final
versions):
1) Changed the initial determination of guilty or not guilty from a dichotomous
response to a 7-point Likert scale: ―Do you think the defendant, John Gardner,
is:‖ with 1 being ―definitely not guilty‖ and 7 being ―definitely guilty.‖ The
dichotomous verdict was asked instead at the end of the questionnaire worded as
―The defendant, John Gardner, is: guilty/not guilty‖.
2) Questions about the evidence were changed from asking ―how important‖ each
piece of evidence was in the decision to how much impact each piece of evidence
had on the participant’s verdict; thus participants are asked ―how did the
following pieces of evidence impact your verdict?‖ and then asked to rate the
impact on a 7-point Likert scale, from 1 ―it made me think the defendant was
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definitely not guilty,‖ to 4 ―no impact,‖ to 7 ―it made me think the defendant was
definitely guilty.‖ The ―no impact‖ option was necessary as the theory is that
people who are told to disregard should not be paying attention to that piece of
information and should select ―no impact,‖ even if they are just doing it because
they think they should.
3) A set of three questions were added regarding the testimony of the forensic
expert, whose testimony is objected to. Participants are asked to rate the impact
on the verdict of his testimony: ―The testimony of forensic expert, Dr. Michaels,
made you think the defendant is:‖ rated on the same 7-point Likert scale described
above. They are also asked to rate both his credibility and his confidence on a 10point Likert scale (Lieberman, Krauss, Kyger, & Lehoux, 2007).
4) Three questions regarding perceptions of inadmissible evidence in general were
added: ―Do you believe jurors can disregard inadmissible evidence once it is
introduced into a trial?‖ ―Do you believe jurors are influenced by inadmissible
evidence once it is introduced into a trial?‖ and ―Do you believe lawyers
introduce evidence they know to be inadmissible in order to influence a jury?‖
(Lee, Krauss, & Lieberman, 2005).
5) The questions regarding whether the participant had read an instruction prior to
the trial summary were altered to emphasize the word ―BEFORE‖ and to include
the phrase ―opening instructions‖ in the follow-up question. Additionally, the
multiple choice options in the follow-up were changed from:
a. Inadmissible evidence is sometimes used by lawyers to create a
strategic advantage.
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b. Inadmissible evidence is often part of the trial and not used in a
strategic way.
c. Inadmissible evidence was not mentioned in the instructions.
d. There was not an instruction from the judge before the trial summary.
To:
Which of the following statements about evidence was included in the
judge’s opening instruction?
Circle all that apply
a. Sometimes a lawyer will object to evidence they believe is not in
accordance with the law.
b. All evidence is allowed into a trial.
c. Certain evidence is introduced by lawyers to influence the jury in an
unfair way.
d. Did not read an opening instruction from the judge.
6) In the pilot, a series of questions were asked about the honesty and
trustworthiness of the witnesses. In the revised questionnaire, participants are
only asked about the honesty of each witness. To measure ―trustworthiness‖
seemed like too much of an abstract construct. Most people can answer a
question regarding honesty, though some said they needed to see the witness and
others simply just circled the same number all the way down without giving much
thought to the actual witness.
7) In the original questionnaire, participants were asked first if they thought the case
was manipulative for each side (―did you find the State’s case manipulative?‖,
―did you find the defense’s case manipulative?‖ ). Participants were then asked if
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they thought the case was strategic for each side. There was some confusion as to
the difference of these questions and if they were really measuring anything
different. The ―strategic‖ questions were removed; the ―manipulative‖ questions
remained to measure whether the ―suspicious‖ instruction could affect the way the
attorneys’ cases were viewed.
8) The first open-ended question was changed from ―briefly list the factors that led
to your decision‖ to ―please briefly explain how you arrived at your decision in
this case.‖
9) Four open-ended questions were added: ―What were the two most important
pieces of evidence against the defendant?‖ ―What were the two most important
pieces of evidence for the defendant?‖ ―Who was the most important witness
against the defendant?‖ and ―Who was the most important witness for the
defendant?‖ There may have been some confusion about what the word ―for‖
means in this situation. For example, some people responded with the same
witnesses in both the ―against‖ question and the ―for‖ question without any
indication of how they thought a witness could be the most important in both
instances. In future studies, I would change that to some other word making it
more obvious that I am asking what witnesses/evidence supported the defense’s
case.
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Appendix B. Trial summary.

The purpose of this research is to understand the process of juror decision-making.
Please imagine that you are a juror in this criminal case as you carefully read the trial
summary.
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Judicial opening instructions were inserted here:
Conditions 1 – 5: No instruction
Conditions 6 – 10: Generic Instruction:
Judge’s Instructions to the Jury
Members of the jury, we are about to proceed with the trial of the case of the State
of Arizona vs. John Gardner. You will read a summary of the testimony. You must
decide what importance to give to the testimony you accept as truthful and accurate.
After carefully evaluating the evidence, you must decide whether that evidence
convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. As judges of the
facts, you alone determine the truthfulness and accuracy of the testimony of each witness.
If a lawyer believes a question or some other presentation of evidence is not in
accord with a rule of law, that lawyer will object. If I overrule the objection, the answer
stands as evidence. If I sustain the objection, the answer is not evidence, the question
and answer are stricken from the record and you are to completely disregard the answer.

Conditions 11 – 15: Suspicious instruction:
Participants received the above instruction with the following paragraph added to
the end:
You should also keep in mind that sometimes certain evidence is introduced into a
trial by a lawyer in an attempt to create a strategic advantage and to influence the jury’s
thinking in an unfair way and you should therefore try not to let this information affect
your thinking about the case.
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State of Arizona vs. John Gardner
State’s Opening Statement
Good morning, my name is Michael Kennedy and I represent the State of Arizona. This
case is not an easy one to talk about—but we must. We must because the evidence will
show that the defendant, John Gardner, brutally murdered Carrie Reese, a sweet and
innocent 17-year-old girl. The evidence will show that on December 6, 2006, the
defendant was arrested by Detective Gary Collins. The defendant, who was driving
through Tucson, Arizona, admits that he was with Carrie the night she was killed, and
that he may even have ―fooled around‖ with her, despite travelling with his girlfriend.
Then he conveniently said that he could not remember what happened next.
You will hear testimony from witnesses who place the defendant with Carrie Reese the
night of December 4, just before she was murdered. You will also hear from a resident
near the crime scene that she saw the defendant’s car parked in the area that night
between 10pm and midnight.
You will hear from a medical expert that the cause of her death was a vicious blow to the
head. And you will hear from a forensics expert that a brown hair sample matched the
defendant’s hair. All of this evidence will show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant, John Gardner is guilty as charged of this horrible act: the brutal murder of a
young girl who had so much to live for.

Defense’s Opening Statement
Good morning, my name is Paul Richards and I represent John Gardner, the defendant.
State Attorney Kennedy was right about one point and one point alone: Detective Collins
arrested the defendant John Gardner on December 6th. At the time of his arrest, John who
is from Texas was driving through Arizona with Lisa Page, his girlfriend. His girlfriend
will tell you that John left that afternoon to help someone jump-start his car, and then
went out drinking, and she didn’t see him until the next morning. Not realizing why he
was being asked, John acknowledged to the police that he recognized Carrie from a
photograph and said he may have been with her.
Members of the jury, after the evidence is presented, the judge will instruct you that John
Gardner is presumed innocent and that the prosecution must prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Once you have examined the facts, I am confident that you will return
a verdict of not guilty. Thank you.
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State’s Evidence
State: To prove the charges in this case, six witnesses will testify. The first witness is
Detective Gary Collins, who questioned the defendant and made the arrest. Detective
Collins is a homicide detective for the Arizona State Police and has investigated close to
a hundred homicides in his twenty-three years on the force. He says that he picked up the
defendant on a street corner two days after Carrie Reese’s body was discovered. He
showed the defendant a picture of the victim—and he recognized her as belonging to a
group of kids he was with that night. In fact, the defendant said he ―fooled around‖ with
the girl. The defendant said he could not remember parts of the night and later woke up
in the back seat of his car.
Defense: On cross-examination, Detective Collins states that when he first stopped the
defendant, John Gardner on the street, John seemed puzzled about why he was being
questioned. Detective Collins says that he took John to the police station for questioning
in order to ―create a situation that is more conducive to talking,‖ that no other officers
were present at the time, and that the interview was not taped in any way. He also says
that John denied any involvement in the murder.
State: The next witness is Dr. Mark Friedland, the pathologist who conducted the
autopsy. The doctor states that bruising on the girl’s neck indicated that the killer tried to
strangle her, but that death was caused by a severe blow to the head, probably from a
blunt object.
THE OBJECTION/ADMISSIBILITY MANIPULATION IS INSERTED HERE.
SEE APPENDIX B FOR THE WORDING OF THE FIVE
OBJECTION/ADMISSIBILITY CONDITIONS.
State: The fourth witness for the state is Joshua Campbell, a clerk at Jack’s Place, where
the victim, Carrie Reese was seen with friends the night she was killed. The store clerk
Mr. Campbell testifies that the defendant was in the store the night of December 4 around
8:30pm, bought a six-pack of beer, and stopped to talk to some kids who were outside the
store. He even recalls seeing the defendant hug Carrie at one point. That was the last
time the store clerk, Mr. Campbell, saw her alive.
Defense: Joshua Campbell, the store clerk, testifies that he saw John leave his store that
night with a group of kids—and that the defendant had hugged Carrie. He says that he
was certain the people hugging were the defendant, John, and Carrie. But on crossexamination, the store clerk admits that he could not see whether John, Carrie, and the
other kids actually left together or went their separate ways.
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State: The State’s next witness is Antonia Kirby, who lives in Avondale, half a block
from where Carrie’s body was found. Avondale resident, Antonia Kirby, saw the
defendant’s white Ford LTD while she was out walking her dog the night of December
4th at about 11:45pm. The car was parked on the dead end street where she lives. She is
sure this was the car and could tell it had a Texas license plate. Mrs. Kirby says she saw
a man asleep in the back seat.
Defense: On cross-examination, Avondale resident Antonia Kirby replies that she could
not see clearly if the man in the backseat was the defendant. She testifies she did not
write down the license plate number and she did not call the police. Finally, she testifies
that the car was not on the street in the morning.
State: The last witness is park partygoer James Webster. He testifies that he was in the
same group as the defendant that night in the park and that he saw the defendant with the
victim, Carrie Reese. He says he saw them arguing loudly and saw Carrie get into a car
with the defendant.
Defense: On cross-examination, partygoer James Webster admits he had never seen the
defendant before that night and did not speak to him at the party. James Webster testifies
that he had ―about six beers that night.‖
State: At this point, the State rests.
Judge: Defense will call their first witness.
Defense: First, 18 year-old Deborah Sloan testifies. Deborah Sloan testifies that she met
the defendant in the park on Friday December 3rd, the night before Carrie was murdered.
She and her friends hung out with the defendant and his girlfriend, Lisa. She did not see
the defendant that Saturday night, but she describes his behavior that Sunday morning as
―normal‖ and said she did not notice any cuts or bruises or blood stains on his clothing.
State: When asked about the Sunday morning after the murder, apartment owner
Deborah Sloan states she did not know whether the defendant had showered and changed
before she saw him.
Defense: The defense also calls Lisa Marie Page, the defendant’s girlfriend, to the stand.
Lisa, who is 19 years old, has known the defendant for two years. She confirms that she
was not with him that Saturday night because he said he was going to help some guy
jump-start his car and then go out drinking. But she did confirm that the defendant was
back in Deborah Sloan’s apartment the next morning. When asked if the defendant has a
violent temper, she replies no.
State: On cross-examination, the defendant’s girlfriend, Lisa admits that while the
defendant often drinks and smokes too much, she has never known him to black out.
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When asked about the defendant’s whereabouts the night of December 4th, she
acknowledges that she expected him to be back that night and was surprised when he did
not show up until the next morning.
Defense: Finally, the defendant, John Gardner, testifies. John confirms that he spent the
early evening with a guy he had met named Ace. After he helped Ace jump-start his car,
he then bought a six-pack of beer and met up with some local kids. The others also had
beer, and some pot, and they all went into the park to get high. He says Carrie Reese may
have been in the group but he wasn’t sure. He admits he fooled around with one girl but
that they did not have sex. As to where he was around midnight, the defendant testifies
that he cannot recall – he passed out and woke up in the back seat of his car at sunrise the
next morning. He saw that everyone was gone, so he drove back to Deborah Sloan’s
apartment and fell asleep on the couch.
State: On cross-examination, the defendant admits identifying the picture of Carrie
Reese when stopped by Detective Collins. As to whether he was alone with Carrie Reese
that night, he says he cannot recall. When asked about the next morning, the defendant
admits he showered when he returned to the apartment.

State’s Closing Argument
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the evidence has shown that the defendant, John
Gardner murdered Carrie Reese. He is last seen with her, he admits to having some form
of sexual interaction with her, his hair is found under her fingernail, and he does not show
up as expected by his girlfriend until the next morning. To make matters worse, he says
he was in the park late that night, yet his car is seen in Avondale, near the murder site.
He claims he passed out, but according to his girlfriend, he has never done that before.
Ladies and gentlemen, you know that the defendant took Carrie to Avondale that night.
Carrie is not here to tell you what happened, but we believe that he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her and when she refused, he got physical. When she fought back, he
tried to strangle her and then killed her with a hard blow to the back of the head. Ladies
and gentlemen, the defendant, John Gardner brutally murdered an innocent 17 year old
girl. After you carefully weigh the evidence, a common sense evaluation of the opposing
stories should convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, John Gardner,
is guilty of murder. We ask that you vote to convict.

Defense’s Closing Argument
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Members of the jury, the defendant, John Gardner is not a murderer. The murder of
Carrie Reese is an awful tragedy. Personally, I hope that whoever is responsible gets
caught, tried, and punished. But the defendant is not that person.
Consider the facts and you will see that the state has no case. The store clerk, Josh
Campbell, says that he saw the defendant with Carrie and some other kids early in the
evening, but that is consistent with John’s own version of where he was and who he was
with. Avondale resident, Antonia Kirby, says she saw the defendant’s car parked on her
street, but she can’t be sure the man she saw sleeping in the back was the defendant.
Both the defendant’s girlfriend, Lisa Marie Page and Debbie Sloan—the girl they stayed
with—said John seemed normal the next morning, and Detective Collins admitted that
when he showed John a picture of Carrie Reese, John did not react defensively or deny
being with her.
The fact that the defendant’s hair was found under her fingernail also does not prove that
he murdered her, only that he was with her. The truth is as John tells it. He was with a
guy he met named Ace, then met up with some local students, then they left to drink and
smoke. John passed out in his car and to this day, he cannot recall what happened to any
of the local kids after that.
Ladies and gentlemen, murder is a horrible crime. John Gardner is an innocent young
man who happened to be in Tucson at the wrong time. There are so many unanswered
questions and so much reasonable doubt that we ask that you vote not guilty.

Judge’s Closing Instructions to the Jury:
Members of the jury, you must now evaluate the evidence. The State must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the crime. If the State
did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime, you
must find the defendant not guilty. If the State did prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime, you must find the defendant guilty. You are to
consider only the evidence. You alone must determine the truthfulness and the accuracy
of each witness. You must also determine what importance to give to the testimony of
each witness. You must disregard any testimony that was objected to and stricken from
the record. This concludes my instructions.
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Appendix C. Wording of trial summary manipulations
Wording for the “no objection” condition:
State: The next witness is Dr. Jerome Michaels, a forensics expert who tested the
victim’s body and clothing for foreign hairs, fibers, and other trace evidence. Dr.
Michaels reports his laboratory findings that a hair sample positively matched that of the
defendant. He also testifies that the hair was recovered from underneath the victim’s
fingernail and that there were no other foreign hairs on the body.
Defense: On cross-examination, forensic expert Dr. Michaels testifies that he knew the
hair was a match to the defendant because he compared a hair sample from the defendant
to the hair found beneath the victim’s fingernail under a microscope.
Also on cross-examination, he admits that a ―match‖ indicates that the hair likely belongs
to the defendant, but cannot rule out the possibility of someone else.

Wording for the “objection/no admonition” condition:
State: The next witness is Dr. Jerome Michaels, a forensics expert who tested the
victim’s body and clothing for foreign hairs, fibers, and other trace evidence. Dr.
Michaels reports his laboratory findings that a hair sample positively matched that of the
defendant. He also testifies that the hair was recovered from underneath the victim’s
fingernail and that there were no other foreign hairs on the body.
Defense: On cross-examination, forensic expert Dr. Michaels testifies that he knew the
hair was a match to the defendant because he compared a hair sample from the defendant
to the hair found beneath the victim’s fingernail under a microscope.
Finally, on cross-examination he admits that a ―match‖ indicates that the hair likely
belongs to the defendant, but cannot rule out the possibility of someone else.
At this point, the defense objects to the forensic testimony of Dr. Michaels.
Judge: The objection is overruled. The forensic testimony of Dr. Michaels will be
allowed to remain on the record.

Wording for the “objection/admonition” condition:
State: The next witness is Dr. Jerome Michaels, a forensics expert who tested the
victim’s body and clothing for foreign hairs, fibers, and other trace evidence. Dr.
Michaels reports his laboratory findings that a hair sample positively matched that of the
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defendant. He also testifies that the hair was recovered from underneath the victim’s
fingernail and that there were no other foreign hairs on the body.
Defense: On cross-examination, forensic expert Dr. Michaels testifies that he knew the
hair was a match to the defendant because he compared a hair sample from the defendant
to the hair found beneath the victim’s fingernail under a microscope.
Also on cross-examination, he admits that a ―match‖ indicates that the hair likely belongs
to the defendant, but cannot rule out the possibility of someone else.
At this point, the defense objects to the forensic testimony of Dr. Michaels.
Judge: The objection is overruled. The forensic testimony of Dr. Michaels will be
allowed to remain on the record. However, the jury is to give the testimony only the
weight they think it deserves when reaching a verdict.

Wording for the “objection/sustained for unreliability” condition:
State: The next witness is Dr. Jerome Michaels, a forensics expert who tested the
victim’s body and clothing for foreign hairs, fibers, and other trace evidence. Dr.
Michaels reports his laboratory findings that a hair sample positively matched that of the
defendant. He also testifies that the hair was recovered from underneath the victim’s
fingernail and that there were no other foreign hairs on the body.
Defense: On cross-examination, forensic expert Dr. Michaels testifies that he knew the
hair was a match to the defendant because he compared a hair sample from the defendant
to the hair found beneath the victim’s fingernail under a microscope.
On cross-examination, forensic expert Dr. Michaels admits he is aware of a recent study
by a major scientific organization stating that matching hair samples under a microscope
is unreliable as a source of identification. He also testifies that hair matching is wrong
around 12% of the time.
Finally, on cross-examination he admits that a ―match‖ indicates that the hair likely
belongs to the defendant, but cannot rule out the possibility of someone else.
At this point, the defense objects to the forensic testimony of Dr. Jerome Michaels and
asks that the hair evidence be stricken from the record due to the unreliable nature of this
evidence.
Judge: Objection is sustained. The jury is to disregard the forensic testimony of Dr.
Michaels.
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Wording for the “objection/sustained for due process” condition:
State: The next witness is Dr. Jerome Michaels, a forensics expert who tested the
victim’s body and clothing for foreign hairs, fibers, and other trace evidence. Dr.
Michaels reports his laboratory findings that a hair sample positively matched that of the
defendant. He also testifies that the hair was recovered from underneath the victim’s
fingernail and that there were no other foreign hairs on the body.
Defense: At this point, the defense objects to the forensic testimony of Dr. Michaels and
asks that the last part of the witness’s testimony be stricken from the record. A motion
was granted prior to the start of the trial that this witness was not to mention where the
hair was recovered from.
Judge: Objection is sustained. The jury is to disregard the forensic testimony of Dr.
Michaels.
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Appendix D. Pilot Questionnaire
1. Do you think the defendant, Mr. John Gardner, is :

Guilty

Not Guilty

2. How confident are you in your decision:
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
(very confident)

3. On a scale of 0% (not likely at all) to 100% (definitely committed the crime), how likely
is it that the defendant, Mr. John Gardner, committed the crime? Please circle one.
0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

55%

60%

65%

70%

75%

80%

85%

90%

95%

100%

4. Please briefly list the factors that led to your decision:

5. Please rate how important the following pieces of evidence were in your decision on a scale of
1 to 10 with 1 being ―not at all important‖ and 10 being ―extremely important‖.
Antonia Kirby’s testimony regarding a white Ford in Avondale
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

John Gardner’s hair on the victim’s body
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

Unidentified hair on the victim’s body
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

James Webster’s testimony regarding an argument
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

6
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John Gardner’s testimony
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

6. How strong was the evidence against the defendant?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

5

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

5

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

5

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

5

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

5

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

5

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

5

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

7. How honest was Antonia Kirby?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

8. How trustworthy was Antonia Kirby?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

9. How honest was Detective Collins?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

10. How trustworthy was Detective Collins?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

11. How honest was Lisa Page?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

12. How trustworthy was Lisa Page?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

13. How honest was Josh Campbell?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4
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14. How trustworthy was Josh Campbell?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

5

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

5

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

5

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

15. How honest was James Webster?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

16. How trustworthy was James Webster?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

17. How honest was John Gardner?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

18. How trustworthy was John Gardner?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

19. How trustworthy was Michael Kennedy, the State’s attorney?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

8

9

10
(extremely)

8

9

10
(extremely)

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

20. How trustworthy was Paul Richards, the Defense attorney?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

6

7

21. How competent was Michael Kennedy, the State’s attorney?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

6

7

22. How competent was Paul Richards, the Defense attorney?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

6

23. Did you view the State’s case as manipulative?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

6
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24. Did you view the Defense’s case as manipulative?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

6

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

7

8

9

10
(extremely)

25. Did you view the State’s case as strategic?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

26. Did you view the Defense’s case as strategic?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

6

27. Do you think the evidence introduced by the State was unfair to the defendant?
1
(not at all)

2

3

4

5

6

7

28. Was there any evidence presented that was objected to?

8

Yes

9

10
(extremely)
No

If yes, please answer the following questions:
a.
b.
c.
d.

What was the evidence? _____________________________________________
Who presented the evidence?
State
Defense
Who objected to it?
State
Defense
Why did the attorney object to the evidence? Circle one
a. The judge had granted a motion before the trial started.
b. The evidence was not reliable.
c. No reason was given.
e. How did the judge rule on the objection? Circle one
Overruled (Evidence was admissible)
Sustained (Inadmissible - Disregard the
evidence)
29. Did you hear an instruction from the judge before the trial summary?
Yes
No
30. Which of the following statements about inadmissible evidence was included in the
instruction from the judge before the trial summary? Circle one
a. Inadmissible evidence is sometimes used by lawyers to create a strategic
advantage.
b. Inadmissible evidence is often part of the trial and not used in a strategic way.
c. Inadmissible evidence was not mentioned in the instructions.
d. There was not an instruction from the judge before the trial summary.
What is your gender?

M

F
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What is your age?

______

What is your highest level of education? __________
Is a language other than English spoken in your home? Yes
If yes, what language? ___________________
Have you ever served on a jury? Yes

No

Were you questioned for a jury today? Yes

No

No
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Appendix E. Final Questionnaire
1. Do you think the defendant, John Gardner, is :
Definitely not guilty

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

Definitely guilty

2. How confident are you in your decision?
Not at all confident

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Very confident

3. On a scale of 0% (not likely at all) to 100% (definitely committed the crime), how
likely is it that the defendant, John Gardner, committed the crime? Please circle one.

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

55%

60%

65%

70%

75%

80%

85%

90%

95%

100%

4. Please briefly explain how you arrived at your decision in this case:

5. How did the following pieces of evidence impact your verdict?
The testimony of Avondale resident, Antonia Kirby, made you think the defendant
is:
Definitely not guilty
1

No impact
2

3

4

Definitely Guilty
5

6

7

The defendant’s hair under the victim’s fingernail made you think the defendant is:
Definitely not guilty
1

No impact
2

3

4

Definitely Guilty
5

6

7
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The testimony of partygoer James Webster made you think the defendant is:
Definitely not guilty
1

No impact
2

3

4

Definitely Guilty
5

6

7

The testimony of the defendant, John Gardner, made you think the defendant is:
Definitely not guilty
1

No impact
2

3

4

Definitely Guilty
5

6

7

The testimony of Detective Collins made you think the defendant is:
Definitely not guilty
1

No impact
2

3

4

Definitely Guilty
5

6

7

The testimony of the defendant’s girlfriend, Lisa Marie Page, made you think the
defendant is:

Definitely not guilty
1

No impact
2

3

4

Definitely Guilty
5

6

7

The testimony of store clerk, Josh Campbell, made you think the defendant is:
Definitely not guilty
1

No impact
2

3

4

Definitely Guilty
5

6

7

The testimony of apartment owner, Deborah Sloan, made you think the defendant
is:
Definitely not guilty
1

No impact
2

3

4

Definitely Guilty
5

6

7

6. How strong was the evidence against the defendant?
Not at all strong

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 Extremely strong
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7.

You read testimony from a forensic expert, Dr. Jerome Michaels, regarding hair
evidence.
7a. The testimony of forensic expert, Dr. Michaels, made you think the defendant is:
Definitely not guilty

No impact

1

2

3

Definitely Guilty

4

5

6

7

7b. How credible was forensic expert, Dr. Michaels?
Not at all credible

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Extremely credible

7c. How confident was forensic expert, Dr. Michaels?
Not at all confident

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Extremely confident

10

Extremely honest

8. How honest was Avondale resident, Antonia Kirby?
Not at all honest

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

9. How honest was Detective Collins?
Not at all honest

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Extremely honest

9

10

Extremely honest

10. How honest was the defendant’s girlfriend, Lisa Marie Page?
Not at all honest

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

11. How honest was apartment owner, Deborah Sloan?
Not at all honest

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Extremely honest

7

8

9

10

Extremely honest

12. How honest was store clerk, Josh Campbell?
Not at all honest

1

2

3

4

5

6
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13. How honest was park partygoer James Webster?
Not at all honest

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Extremely honest

9

10

Extremely honest

14. How honest was the defendant, John Gardner?
Not at all honest

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

15. How trustworthy was State Attorney Kennedy?
Not at all trustworthy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 Extremely trustworthy

7

8

9

10 Extremely competent

9

10 Extremely trustworthy

16. How competent was State Attorney Kennedy?
Not at all competent

1

2

3

4

5

6

17. How trustworthy was Defense Attorney Richards?
Not at all trustworthy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

18. How competent was Defense Attorney Richards?
Not at all competent

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 Extremely competent

19. Did you view the State Attorney’s case as manipulative?
Not at all manipulative

1 2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Extremely manipulative

10

Extremely manipulative

20. Did you view the Defense Attorney’s case as manipulative?
Not at all manipulative

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

21. Do you think the evidence introduced by the State Attorney was unfair to the
defendant?
Not at all unfair

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Extremely unfair
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22. Are you convinced by the evidence introduced by the State Attorney?
Not at all convinced

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Extremely convinced

23. Are you convinced by the evidence introduced by the Defense Attorney?
Not at all convinced

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Extremely convinced

24. Overall, what were the two most important pieces of evidence against the defendant?

25. Overall, what were the two most important pieces of evidence for the defendant?

26. Overall, which witness was the most important against the defendant?

27. Overall, which witness was the most important for the defendant?

28. The defendant, John Gardner, is:

Guilty

29. Was there any evidence presented that was objected to?

Not guilty
Yes

No

If yes, please answer the following questions:
e.
f.
g.
h.

What was the evidence?
Who presented the evidence?
State
Defense
Who objected to it?
State
Defense
Why did the attorney object to the evidence?
a. The judge had granted a motion before the trial started.
b. The evidence was not reliable.
c. No reason was given.
e. How did the judge rule?
Overruled (Admissible)
Sustained (Inadmissible)

30. Did you read an opening instruction from the judge BEFORE the trial summary?
Yes

No

31. Which of the following statements about evidence was included in the judge’s opening
instruction? Circle all that apply
a. Sometimes a lawyer will object to evidence they believe is not in accordance with the
law.
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b. All evidence is allowed into a trial.
c. Certain evidence is introduced by lawyers to influence the jury in an unfair way.
d. Did not read an opening instruction from the judge.

In general:
32. Do you believe jurors can disregard inadmissible evidence once it is introduced into a
trial?
Definitely can’t disregard

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Definitely can disregard

33. Do you believe jurors are influenced by inadmissible evidence once it is introduced into
a trial?
Definitely not influenced 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Definitely influenced

34. Do you believe lawyers introduce evidence they know is inadmissible in order to
influence a jury?
Not at all

1

2

What is your sex?
What is your age?

3

4

M

5

6

7

8

9

10

F
______

What is your highest level of education? __________
Is a language other than English spoken in your home?

Yes

If yes, what language? ___________________
Have you ever served on a jury?

Yes

If yes, was it civil or criminal:
Were you questioned for a jury today?

No
Civil
Yes

Criminal
No

No

Definitely
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Appendix F. Informed Consent

Research Participation Information Form
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this research is
to examine how an individual juror processes information. We plan to enroll 250
participants into this study. If you decide to participate, you will be asked to read a short
summary of a murder trial and answer a brief questionnaire based on what you read.
Participation should take about 30 minutes for one day.
The risks of participation in this study are minimal. The potential benefit to
society is a further understanding of the juror’s ability to process information.
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You can refuse to
participate without consequences. If you decide not to participate your decision will not
affect your relationship with John Jay College or the New York State Court System. If
you decide to participate, you may stop participation at any time. You may refuse to
answer any questions at any time during the study. Withdrawal or refusing to answer
specific questions will not result in any consequences to you and will not affect your
relationship with John Jay College or the New York State Court System.
Information collected from you will be recorded for your responses only. Your
name will not appear on the data in any way. This consent form is being collected as an
acknowledgement that you are volunteering to participate and has no connection to your
responses on the questionnaire. The consent forms and the questionnaires will be
destroyed after the research is complete.
Your signature below means that you have read this consent form, that you fully
understand the nature and consequences of participation and that you have had all
questions regarding participation in this study answered satisfactorily. If you have
further questions about this research please feel free to contact the Principal Investigator,
Courtney Hougham at chougham@jjay.cuny.edu.
If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research participant please
feel free to contact the John Jay Institutional Review Board office at jj-irb@jjay.cuny.edu
or 212-237-8961.
Thank you for your participation.
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Appendix G. Initial results of two-way ANOVAs and multiple regression for the
continuous dependent variables.

ANOVA – type of instruction by type of objection/ruling
All continuous dependent variables were subjected to a two-way analysis of
variance with three levels of type of instruction (none, generic, suspicious) and five levels
of type of objection/ruling (none, no reason specified – overruled with no
admonishment, no reason specified – overruled with admonishment, reliability reason –
sustained, due process reason – sustained).
The type of instruction yielded a main effect on the question regarding the
likelihood that the defendant committed the crime, F(2,223) = 3.565, p = .030, partial

2

= .031. Post hoc comparisons showed that the suspicious group (M = 47.31, SD = 28.75)
was significantly lower than the no instruction group (M = 59.11, SD = 26.50) suggesting
that those who had read the suspicious instruction thought it less likely that the defendant
had committed the crime when compared to the control group.
The type of instruction had a main effect on ratings of the impact of Detective
Collins’ testimony on the verdict, F(2,223) = 3.495, p = .032, partial

2

= .030. Post hoc

comparisons showed that the suspicious group (M = 3.79, SD = 1.402) was significantly
lower than the no instruction group (M = 4.33, SD = 1.316); he had more of a not guilty
impact in the suspicious group than he did in the no instruction group. However, this
ANOVA did not pass Levene’s test of equality of error variances, F(14,223) = 1.841, p =
.034.
The type of objection/ruling had a main effect on ratings of the impact of Dr.
Michaels’ forensic testimony on verdict, F(4,224) = 2.481, p = .045, partial

2

= .042.
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Post hoc comparisons showed that the inadmissible reliability condition yielded lower
guilt impact ratings (M = 4.48, SD = 1.502) when compared to both the admissible no
admonishment group (M = 5.08, SD = 1.514) and the inadmissible due process group (M
= 5.40, SD = 1.233). Additionally, the inadmissible due process group had significantly
higher guilt impact ratings when compared to the no objection group (M = 4.79, SD =
1.677). Participants in the inadmissible due process group rated Dr. Michaels’ testimony
as having the highest average guilt impact.
The type of objection/ruling had a main effect on ratings of Dr. Michaels’
credibility, F(4,225) = 4.320, p = .002, partial

2

= .071. There was also a significant

interaction between type of instruction and type of ruling/objection, F(8,225) = 1.979, p =
.050, partial

2

= .066. Post hoc comparisons show that Dr. Michaels was rated as

significantly less credible by the participants in the inadmissible reliability group (M =
5.57, SD = 2.677) when compared to every other condition. The interaction shows that
the effect of the type of instruction was much greater in the inadmissible due process
group than all other conditions (see Figure G1). However, this ANOVA did not pass
Levene’s test of equality of error variances, F(14,225) = 2.460, p = .003.
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Figure G1. Interaction effect on the rating of Dr. Michaels’ credibility

The type of objection/ruling had a main effect on ratings of Dr. Michaels’
confidence, F(4,223) = 4.901, p = .001, partial

2

= .081. LSD post hoc comparisons

show that Dr. Michaels was rated as significantly less confident by the participants in the
inadmissible reliability condition (M = 5.33, SD = 2.731) when compared to every other
condition. Tukey post hoc comparisons showed the participants in the inadmissible
reliability condition rated him as less confident only when compared to the admissible
admonishment (M = 6.72, SD = 2.491) and the inadmissible due process (M = 7.49, SD =
2.321) conditions. However, this ANOVA did not pass Levene’s test of equality of error
variances, F(14,223) = 1.751, p = .048.
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The type of objection/ruling had a main effect on participants’ rating of the
strength of the evidence, F(4,226) = 2.797, p = .027, partial

2

= .047. Post hoc

comparisons show that participants in the inadmissible reliability group (M = 3.980, SD =
2.537) rated the evidence as significantly weaker when compared to the admissible no
admonishment group (M = 5.344, SD = 2.558) and the admissible admonishment group
(M = 5.458, SD = 2.910). Post hoc comparisons also reveal that participants in the
inadmissible due process group (M = 4.292, SD = 2.617) rated the evidence as weaker
when compared to the admissible admonishment group.
The type of objection/ruling had a main effect on participants’ rating of the
fairness of the evidence introduced by the state, F(4,222) = 2.791, p = .027, partial

2

=

.048. Post hoc comparisons show that participants in the inadmissible due process group
(M = 4.81, SD = 3.021) rated the evidence as significantly more unfair when compared to
the no objection group (M = 3.62, SD = 2.623), the admissible no admonishment group
(M = 3.40, SD = 2.386), and the admissible admonishment group (M = 3.51, SD =
2.135). The inadmissible due process group was not different from the inadmissible
reliability group (M = 4.40, SD = 2.568); nor was the latter group significantly different
from any other group.
The type of instruction had a significant main effect on participants’ ratings of the
State’s Attorney’s competence, F(2,223) = 4.746, p = .010, partial

2

= .041. Post hoc

comparisons showed that the suspicious group (M = 6.09, SD = 2.314) rated the State
Attorney as significantly less competent when compared to both the no instruction group
(M = 6.81, SD = 2.326) and the generic group (M = 7.16, SD = 1.984). There was no
significant difference on competence rating between the no instruction group and the
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generic group.
Participants were asked to rate both attorneys on level of manipulativeness. There
was no significant main effect for type of instruction when the attorneys were looked at
separately, i.e. an attorney was not considered more or less manipulative individually
across conditions. A difference variable was created by subtracting the manipulative
rating of the Defense Attorney from the manipulative rating of the State Attorney to see if
one attorney was viewed as more manipulative than the other depending on condition. A
significant main effect for instruction was found for the manipulation difference variable,
F(2,223) = 3.597, p = .029, partial

2

= = .031.

Post hoc comparisons showed that the suspicious group (MD = 1.33, SD = 2.962)
rated the State Attorney as significantly more manipulative than the Defense Attorney
when compared to both the no instruction group (MD =.18, SD = 3.253) and the generic
group (MD = .26, SD = 2.927). There was no significant difference on the manipulation
difference variable between the no instruction group and the generic group.
A similar difference variable was created for attorney competence. There was
also a main effect for type of instruction on this difference variable, F(2,222) = 3.463, p =
.033, partial

2

= .030. Post hoc comparisons showed that the suspicious group (MD = -

.78, SD = 2.693) rated the State Attorney as significantly less competent than the Defense
Attorney when compared to the generic group (MD = .31, SD = 2.630). There was no
significant difference on the manipulation difference variable between the no instruction
group and the generic group or between the suspicious group and the no instruction
group. However, this ANOVA did not pass Levene’s test of equality of error variances,
F(14,222) = 1.975, p = .021.
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Participants were asked to rate whether they thought people in general can
disregard inadmissible evidence. Neither type of instruction nor type of objection/ruling
yielded a main effect on this question, but there was a significant interaction, F(8,215) =
2.093, p = .038, partial

2

= .072. The interaction shows that the effect of the type of

instruction was greater in the no objection condition and in the inadmissible reliability
condition. In the no objection condition, participants thought people could disregard
inadmissible evidence when they were not given a pre-instruction; however, when they
did receive an instruction prior to the trial summary, the rating decreased. Conversely,
participants in the inadmissible reliability conditions gave a low rating when they did not
receive an instruction and a much higher rating when they did, especially the suspicious
instruction (see figure G2).
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Figure G2. Interaction effect.

ANOVA – type of instruction by type of ruling
Due to the small number of significant main effects by objection/ruling, variables
were combined to examine whether there were significant differences among participants
depending on whether the objection was overruled vs. sustained. An ANOVA was run
on all variables for type of instruction by type of ruling. The ANOVA excluded
conditions where no objection was made. There should be significant differences
regarding ratings of guilt and strength of evidence depending on whether the evidence
was allowed or disallowed if jurors are treating inadmissible evidence as separate and
ignoring it. Because the main effects for type of instruction were already discussed
previously, they will not be discussed here. This section will look at significant main
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effects for type of ruling and significant interactions.
There was a significant main effect for type of ruling guilt, F(1,187) = 4.231, p =
.041, partial

2

= .022. Participants in the sustained conditions (M = 3.866, SD = 1.585)

thought the defendant was significantly less guilty than those in the overruled conditions
(M = 4.349, SD = 1.656).
The type of ruling had a main effect on participants’ rating of the likelihood that
the defendant committed the crime, F(1,186) = 3.812, p = .05, partial

2

= .020.

Participants in the sustained conditions believed the defendant was less likely to have
committed the crime (M = 48.66, SD = 26.882) than participants in the overruled
conditions (M = 56.47, SD = 29.062).
The type of ruling had a main effect on the rating of the strength of the evidence,
2

F(1,187) = 11.121, p = .001, partial

= .056. Participants in the sustained conditions

rated the overall evidence against the defendant as significantly weaker (M = 4.134, SD =
2.568) than the participants in the overruled conditions (M = 5.401, SD = 2.726).
Type of ruling yielded a main effect on ratings of Dr. Michaels’ credibility,
F(1,186) = 6.730, p = .010, partial

2

= .033. Participants in the sustained conditions

rated him as significantly less credible (M = 6.24, SD = 2.756) than participants in the
overruled conditions (M = 7.17, SD = 2.146).
Participants rated the evidence introduced by the state as significantly more unfair
(M = 4.61, SD = 2.791) in the sustained conditions than they did in the overruled
conditions (M = 3.45, SD = 2.254). The main effect was significant, F(1, 183) = 9.696, p
= .002, partial

2

= .050.

While there was no significant main effect by type of ruling on the created
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manipulation difference variable (State Attorney manipulation rating – Defense Attorney
manipulation rating), there was a significant interaction between type of instruction and
type of ruling, F(2, 185) = 3.412, p = .035, partial

2

= .036. See Figure G3 for a

depiction of the interaction.
Closer examination of the mean differences showed that the effect of the type of
instruction was much larger in the sustained conditions than in the overruled conditions.
Participants in the suspicious instruction and sustained conditions rated the State
Attorney an average of 2.5 points more manipulative than they rated the defense attorney.
This is compared to the suspicious instruction/overruled conditions where participants
rated the State Attorney as only .47 points more manipulative than they rated the defense.
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Figure G3. Interaction effect between instruction and type of ruling on difference in
manipulation rating of the State Attorney v. the Defense Attorney

Regression Analysis using “No Instruction” as the reference group. Using
the enter method, significant models were found with the following dependent variables:
likelihood the defendant committed the crime (F2,235=3.715, p = .026, adjusted r2 = .031),
the impact of Detective Collins testimony (F2,235 = 3.484, p = .032, adjusted r2 = .021), the
competence of the State Attorney (F2,235 = 4.822, p = .009, adjusted r2 = .031), difference
on manipulation ratings between the state and the defense (F2,235 = 3.541, p = .031,
adjusted r2 = .021), difference on competence ratings between the state and the defense
(F2,234 = 3.559, p = .030, adjusted r2 = .021). See Table G1 for a summary of B and beta
weights.
Two manipulation checks were included at the end of the questionnaire:
participants were asked whether any evidence was objected to and whether they had read
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an instruction prior to the trial summary. Twenty-eight participants incorrectly said they
had read an instruction when they had not. No participant said they had not read an
instruction when they had. Thirty-two participants incorrectly said that no evidence was
objected to. No participant in the no objection conditions answered that evidence was
objected to.
The dummy coded variables were re-run using a stepwise method putting the
error check variable on the second step to check whether the error increased the
predictive power of the model. For the instruction independent variable, participants
answering the manipulation checks in error did not affect the model; therefore, those
results are not reported here. Because the error check variable did not increase predictive
power of the model, it was decided that those participants who had answered the question
incorrectly would remain in the dataset.
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Table G1. Summary of B weights and Beta weights for significant regression models
using the ―No Instruction‖ group as the baseline.
95% Confidence Interval
Predictor

B

SE B

Beta

Sig

DV
Likelihood

Collins Testimony

Upper

bound

Bound

52.880

65.348
.336

59.114

3.164

Generic Instruction

-8.481

4.475

-.141

.059

-17.298

Suspicious

-

4.461

-.196

.009

-20.590

-3.012

Instruction

11.801
4.028

4.639

-.550

.308

-.975

-.117

6.320

7.300

-.339

1.039

-1.416

-.025

-.496

.851

Constant

4.333

.155

-.121

.218

-.041

.579

-.546

.218

-.187

.013

6.810

.249

.350

.350

.074

.317

-.720

.353

-.151

.042

Constant

.177

.342

Generic Instruction

.082

.481

.013

.865

-.865

1.029

Suspicious

1.156

.485

.177

.018

.200

2.112

Suspicious
Instruction
Constant
Generic Instruction
Suspicious
Instruction
Manipulation

Lower

Constant

Generic Instruction

State Competence

B

Diff.

Instruction

Regression analysis using “Inadmissible Reliability” as the reference group.
Using the enter method, significant models were found with the following dependent
variables: impact of Dr. Michaels testimony on verdict (F4,234 = 2.521, p = .042, adjusted
r2 = .025), rating of Dr. Michaels credibility (F4,235 = 4.139, p = .003, adjusted r2 = .050),
rating of Dr. Michaels confidence (F4,233 = 4.844, p = .001, adjusted r2 = .061), strength of
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the evidence (F4,234 = 2.814, p = .026, adjusted r2 = .029), and fairness of the evidence
(F4,232 = 2.792, p = .027, adjusted r2 = .029). Although using ―fairness of the evidence‖ as
the dependent variable produced a significant regression model, using ―Inadmissible
Reliability‖ as the reference group resulted in non-significant comparisons to the other
conditions.
Again, a stepwise regression was used to test whether the error variable added
predictive power to the model. The model increased in predictive power when the person
answered a manipulation check incorrectly in the question regarding the strength of the
evidence (F5,235 = 4.338, p = .001, adjusted r2 = .065). When the participant incorrectly
responded that she had not heard an objection when she had, she was more likely to act
like those who really had not heard an objection or those in which an objection was
overruled. See Table G2 for a summary of B and beta weights. Due to the large number
of independent variables, only the constants and the significant beta weights will be
reported.
Regression analysis using the contrast coded variables. Using the enter
method, a multiple regression was run using the created contrast coded variables.
Significant models were found for five dependent variables. Only the constants and the
significant B and beta weights will be reported. See Table 3G for a summary of
significant results. All the questions regarding Dr. Michaels yielded significant
regression models when the four contrast coded variables were used as the predictors: the
impact of Dr. Michaels testimony (F4,234=2.521 , p = .042, adjusted r2 = .025), Dr.
Michaels’ credibility (F4,235 = 4.139, p = .003, adjusted r2 = .050), and Dr. Michaels’
confidence (F4,233 = 4.844, p = .001, adjusted r2 = .061). Additionally, the dependent
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variables evidence strength (F4,236 = 2.814, p = .026, adjusted r2 = .029) and evidence
fairness (F4,232 = 2.792, p = .027, adjusted r2 = .029) regressed by the contrast coded
independent variables yielded significant results.
Table G2. Summary of significant B weights and Beta weights for significant regression
models using the ―Inadmissible Reliability‖ group as the baseline.
95% Confidence
Predictor

B

SE
B

Beta

Sig

DV

Interval B
Lower

Upper

bound

Bound

4.057

4.902

Impact of Dr. Michaels’

Constant

4.479

2.14

testimony

Adm No Admon

.604

.303

.161

.048

.007

1.202

Inadmissible DP

.917

.303

.245

.003

.319

1.514

Constant

5.571

.341

4.900

6.243

No object

1.533

.484

.251

.002

.579

2.487

Adm No Admon

1.741

.484

.285

.000

.787

2.695

AdmAdmon

1.449

.484

.237

.003

.495

2.404

Inadmissible DP

1.365

.487

.222

.005

.405

2.324

Constant

5.333

.351

4.642

6.024

No object

1.104

.496

.177

.027

.127

2.081

Adm No Admon

1.271

.496

.204

.011

.294

2.248

Adm Admon

1.390

.499

.221

.006

.408

2.372

Inadmissible DP

2.156

.499

.343

.000

1.174

3.138

Constant

3.980

.385

3.222

4.737

Adm No Admon

1.364

.547

.200

.013

.287

.2.441

Adm Admon

1.479

.547

.217

.007

.402

2.556

Constant

3.675

.390

2.907

4.442

No object

1.164

.540

.170

.032

.101

2.227

Adm No Admon

1.238

.538

.181

.022

.178

2.298

Adm Admon

1.425

.537

.209

.009

.367

2.482

Inadm DP

.401

.537

.059

.456

-.657

1.460

Error

1.149

.363

.201

.002

.433

1.865

Dr. Michaels Credibility

Dr. Michaels Confidence

Evidence Strength – Step 1

Step 2

133

Table G3. Summary of significant B weights and Beta weights for significant regression
models using the contrast-coded independent variables.
95% Confidence
Predictor

B

SE B

Beta

Sig

DV

Interval B
Lower

Upper

bound

Bound

4.743

5.122

-.757

-.160

6.486

7.092

Impact of Dr. Michaels’

Constant

4.932

.096

Testimony

Inadm Rel v. Inadm

-.458

.152

Constant

6.789

.154

Inadm Rel v. Inadm

-.682

.243

-.177

.005

-1.162

-.203

Admis v. Inadmis

.456

.172

.167

.009

.117

.796

Constant

6.518

.157

6.207

6.828

Inadm Rel v. Inadm

-1.078

.249

-1.569

-.587

Constant

4.806

.173

4.465

5.148

Admis v. Inadm

.633

.194

.251

1.014

Constant

3.949

.166

3.621

4.277

Admis v. Inadm

-.577

.186

-.944

-.210

-.193

.003

DP
Dr. Michaels’ Credibility

DP
Dr. Michaels’ confidence

-.272

.000

DP
Evidence strength

Evidence fairness

.208

-.199

.001

.002
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